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ABSTRACT
Emotional Behavior in Subclinical Psychopathy
by
Kristen Lee Godenick
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Psychology
Loma Linda University, September 2009
Dr. Paul Haerich, Chairperson

The unique interpersonal qualities of individuals who fall on the so-called
‘psychopathic spectrum’ have been regularly documented since Cleckley’s observations
(1941). The literature reflects the importance of understanding individuals who have
high and low levels of psychopathic personality traits for research (Lilienfeld, 1998,
Patrick, Edens, Poythress, Lilienfeld & Benning, 2006), clinical (Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen
& Krueger, 2003) and risk assessment purposes (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld &
Cade, 2003) through bringing forth the position that psychopathic traits can fall on a
continuum (Benning, Patrick, Salekin & Leistico, 2005). The purpose of this study was
to investigate the association between psychopathic personality traits in the general
population and deficits in emotion modulated psychophysiological responses as well as
deficits in emotionally influenced decision making. Results indicated that individuals
with higher levels of Fearless Dominance, as measured by the Psychopathic Personality
Inventory, Revised (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) had attenuated fear responses (r = -0.26;
Chi-square = 5.286, j? < .05), but there were no significant abnormalities in responses to
other emotional conditions. There was no association between psychopathic personality
traits and emotionally influenced decision making as measured by the Iowa Gambling
Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994) suggesting that at subclinical
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levels, psychopathic personality traits have a negligible influence on an individual’s use
of somatic markers to guide behavior.

x

Introduction

Mr. C J. is a 59-year-old, right handed, single, Caucasian-American male who
was committed by the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County to the California
Department of Mental Health on September 22, 1995. He was admitted to Atascadero
State Hospital (ASH) the following year after being found incompetent to stand trial. In
July of 1995, while on federal parole, Mr. C.J. entered the lot of a car dealership and stole
a vehicle. When a police officer attempted to pull him over for speeding, he gave chase.
After his car crashed into another vehicle, he attempted to run. Mr. C.J. was hospitalized
pending a hearing of his case due to his lawyer’s report that he was actively hallucinating
during an interview. Results of a malingering evaluation performed at ASH reveal that
Mr. C.J. was acutely malingering psychotic symptoms. Notes about his presentation at
the evaluation state that he was “cold, aloof, and intelligent” with “superficial
cooperation” and “disturbing lack of concern” for the crash victim involved in the instant
offense.
Mr. M.H. is a 36-year-old, right handed, single Caucasian-American male who
has a history of multiple short term relationships throughout his 20’s that were usually
ended by the decision of his girlfriends. They usually complained that he “was too
selfish” and “didn’t seem to care about his family.” He is described by others as an
intelligent, well-dressed, superficially social individual who spends most of his time
talking about his business dealings with anyone who will listen. He is proud of the fact
that he got to where he is today in upper management. He tells others it is through his
own merit and hard work but in fact he really gained the position by stealing some
company information and then blackmailing a fellow employee. He owes significant
1
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child support pay to several of his previous girlfriends but believes that the children are
getting in the way of his business success.
Psychopathy is a unique psychological syndrome characterized by a pervasive and
chronic disturbance in one’s ability to relate to others, self, and the general environment.
These patterns of interacting are usually at the root of the individual’s commonly
expressed antisocial behaviors. The psychopathic individual is highly prone to perceive,
think, feel, and act in relatively stable way across situations, time frames, and social
situations. Although not formally classified in the DSM-IV-TR, psychopathy is similar
to other personality disorders because of these characteristics. Psychopathy, like the
severe personality disorders, is therefore tremendously hard to treat and presents
clinicians with a challenge. Because psychopathy remains one of the few psychological
disorders with few to no treatment options, society is left to rely on containment
interventions (e.g., incarceration, community supervision) (English, 1998) However, the
containment approaches are only relevant if the individual happens to become involved
with the criminal justice system (such as in the case of Mr. C.J.). Even then, the
individual may not always be held in prison for life, instead being shifted in and out of
prisons over his or her lifetime. If the individual is not currently or never has been
involved with the criminal justice system, it is not likely that he will receive treatment,
such as with the case of M. H.
Although there is no direct age where one can say psychopathy starts, it can best
be viewed as a developmental disorder that evolves throughout the lifespan. The disorder
can be detected throughout all stages of development from childhood through
adolescence into adulthood (Larsson, Andershed & Lichtenstein, 2006; Blair, 2006).
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Historically, the term “psychopathy” has been interchanged with “sociopathy” and
“antisocial personality.” The current clinical term for individuals like C J. and M.H
mentioned above is “psychopath.” Psychopathy is considered a clinical syndrome, while
individuals with “psychopathic personality traits” are not considered a clinical
population.
The impact of psychopathy on today’s society is immense, with a large population
of criminals who are incarcerated meeting the criteria (Rhodes, 2000). The syndrome
appears to act contrary to the process of human evolution; in some cases it may compel
one member of the species to kill another member. It continues to disturb and confuse
researchers, laypersons, clinicians and the criminal justice system. We as human beings
often experience emotions such as guilt, regret, and sympathy. It is therefore difficult to
imagine a lifetime spent without such feelings, as we imagine the psychopaths’s
experience to be. To a psychopath, the lack of these feelings leads to exploitation of
others and the resulting behavioral pattern is so ingrained that it has become like
breathing.
A study by Porter & Woodworth (2006) looked at the characteristics of violent
homicides committed and the way that the perpetrators explained or described their own
actions. A significant difference arose between psychopaths and non-psychopaths
regarding the likelihood of committing instrumental homicides (e.g., premeditated or
planned). Interestingly, when the self reports of the violence were compared,
psychopaths described the planning of their homicides to a greater degree than non
psychopaths. However, those diagnosed with psychopathy were also significantly more
likely to omit major details of their offense. Studies like the one above, which represent
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the criminal justice literature on the subject, illustrate the psychopaths’ ability to describe
pre-planned violence while simultaneously minimizing the crime with omitted details.
Researchers might suggest that the psychopaths’ behavior in this study occurred because
they were proud of their planning strategies and at the same time interested in selfpreservation.
Psychopathy is differentiated from the personality disorders listed in the DSM-IV
based on symptoms that are now commonly classified into two major factors, although
alternative factor structures, such as the four factor model, have also been presented in
the literature (Hare, 2003). The first factor is composed of affective and interpersonally
defined traits including a distinct, profound lack of empathy, superficial emotional
expression, superficial charm, deceitfulness, glibness, shallow and labile affect, inability
to bond with others, lack of guilt, and unusually low levels of anxiety. The second factor
is made up of behaviorally defined traits such as impulsivity, sensation seeking, lack of
caution and antisocial/criminal activities and lifestyles. The focus of this research study
will be on the first factor or the affective component. In particular, the affective
component is the most unique part of the disorder. It is what separates psychopathy from
the more commonly diagnosed Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD). APD diagnoses
are usually made based on antisocial activities and behaviors which do not usually have
the affective component.

Background

Two events marked the development of psychopathy research. First, Cleckley
clarified what had begun to be discussed in the field and offered a description of
symptoms and behaviors that marked a turning point in the understanding of
psychopathy. Before his work, a number of approaches were presented without much
coalescence in the field. Later, Hare’s research, based upon the original ideas of
Cleckley, ushered in the development of a means to accurately measure psychopathy for
research purposes. After these two events, research with Hare’s measure continued as
new questions about brain and behavior relationships in psychopathy arose.

Psychopathy Before Cleckley
The subject of psychopathy has been woven in to the fabric of medical and
psychological literature beginning significantly in the late part of the 19th century. The
earliest writings on the subject focused on case studies and the commonalities between
them. Prichard (1835) is credited with publishing the terms “moral insanity” and “moral
imbecility” to describe psychopaths. These terms seem to be reflective of the Victorian
sense of morality that pervaded society at the time. Psychopathy was addressed as more
than a just a moral problem encountered on an individual patient basis and was placed in
the context of a societal problem later in this century. In 1877, Teed published an article
in Postgraduate Medicine that speculated on the differences between insanity and
criminality. He also mentioned the dilemma faced by courts on how to properly treat the
insane versus the criminal; he termed the latter as having a “willful disregard.. .of the
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fitness of things, with absence of control over the actions.” Teed alluded to top-down
control of the nervous system in his explanation about the behavior of the insane.
According to his writings, they are likely to have what we now know as disinhibition
syndromes; he suggested that insanity results from “higher nervous centres” which are
“overcome by more powerful excitations arising either reflexively...or by an automatic
action of the brain itself...” Thus, the insane person is allowed a legal excuse for his
behaviors and is relieved of the blame for his crime, whereas the criminal has no such
excuse. Teed’s description of criminals, which paralleled later clinical descriptions of
psychopathy is rather interesting. He suggested that “lewdness may be chosen for its
own sake and the gratification it may yield.. .so also may dishonesty or cruelty, these are
preferred intelligently; and this condition... is depravity, not insanity... courses of action
may be followed, regardless of consequences, all teachings of ethics are trampled
underfoot...” Teed was correct in his assumptions that there is a distinct difference
between insane acts and criminal acts. What he described is what we now know as the
difference between an individual who has capacity for intent and understanding of the
actions he is undertaking and an individual who does not.
Following Teed’s work, Koch (1891) offered a description of patients who are not
entirely insane but remain greatly maladjusted in their daily living. Koch was referring to
neurotic people, or as they are known today, those suffering from anxiety and depression.
His classification of these individuals has usually been rejected by others who attempt to
describe a “purer” psychopathy, such as Cleckley (1941), because he included the
psychoneurotic conditions in his classification. At the time, anxiety and mood disorders
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may have been associated with psychopathy. Today, research has suggested that they are
less associated (Lovelace & Gannon, 1999).
At the turn of the century the thrust in the field of psychology was classification
of mental disorders. The “moral insanity” described by previous clinicians continued to
be classified and re-classified accordingly. In 1904 Meyer suggested that psychopathy
did not have components of neuroticism and labeled these individuals as being
“constitutionally inferior.” He essentially disagreed with the inclusion of psychoneurotic
conditions amongst those termed “morally insane.”
Bimbaum (1909 in Davidson) contributed the first idea that psychopathy was
primarily a defect of emotion, terming the condition “pathological affectivity” and that
this entity was separate from criminality per se. Bimbaum was not specific in what this
“defect” was and did not clarify whether the primary difficulty was with an absence of
emotion or the presence of a maladaptive emotion. One aspect of Bimbaum’s definition
of psychopathy that others disagreed with was the intellectual inferiority of the
psychopath. Most other clinicians of the time period recognized that the psychopath was
at average or above average intelligence.
The first individual to coin the term “psychopathic personality” was Kraeplin
(1915) who described seven types of psychopathy, such as the excitable or the impulsive.
At the time Kraeplin was attempting to classify the cases he knew about and there was
marked diversity within his classification system. This diversity in Kraeplin’s system
hints at the future difficulties of clinicians in pinpointing the hallmark symptoms of
psychopathy.
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Finally, White (1935) was one of the first people to consider psychopathy in a
psychodynamic light and suggested that the root of the problem was a marked immaturity
in the psychopath’s drives and ego development. This perspective was later developed in
the early 1950’s when the popularity of psychodynamic therapies was at a peak in the
United States.

Cleckley
The Mask of Sanity (Cleckley, 1941) was a seminal work on psychopathy that was
written to address the confusion in the psychiatric community concerning the defining
characteristics of the disorder. Based on numerous observations from his time spent as a
psychiatrist at the University of Georgia, Cleckley’s work highlighted several areas.
First, he suggested that there was a need to differentiate between what was essential to
the construct of psychopathy and what was not. Second, he described nine cases in story
format. Cleckley then described the “disorder as a part manifestation” which is similar
to the currently defined “non-criminal” psychopath. According to Cleckley, these
individuals exist in the world unaffected by either the mental health system or the
criminal justice system. As an example, in “The Psychopath as Scientist” he described a
physics professor who liked to blame others for his numerous personal and professional
problems.
In addition to the case descriptions of both criminal and non-criminal
psychopaths, Cleckley explained what he thought the important differences were between
psychopathy and a number of other clinical disorders of the time. These included what
we currently call psychosis, developmental disability, alcoholism, mood disorder, sexual
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deviancy, conduct disorder, malingering, genius, organic brain disease, and ordinary
criminal behavior.
From Cleckley’s perspective there were many different factors that are present in
a psychopath. Cleckley psychopaths, as described in The Mask of Sanity, were usually
superficially attractive, made strong positive impressions and presented with average to
above average intelligence. He indicated that they do not present with psychotic features
of any kind, although it is known that many psychopaths in custody of the mental health
or criminal justice system may attempt to fake psychosis for personal gain. Consistent
with what contemporary psychologists call ‘factor one’ or ‘affective’ characteristics,
Cleckley reported that psychopaths have no sense of responsibility to others, and when
confronted with the effect that their unreliability has on others, they do not usually feel
empathy or guilt. He suggested that they lie frequently and fail to see the social stigma
attached to lying, instead viewing a lie as a convenient means to gain a desired end.
Although they realize that saying common phrases to place blame on themselves such as
“I’m sorry” work to assuage others around them, they never truly own their own mistakes
and often project blame onto others. Cleckley implied that if one were to question them
about why they “blame” themselves, they truly cannot find an answer. They lack a sense
of shame. Consistent with what modem psychologists refer to as ‘factor two’ or
‘behavioral’ characteristics, Cleckley suggested that psychopaths often commit theft,
fraud, or other asocial acts for minor reasons with sometimes no goal; these acts are
usually committed at greater risk of being discovered than usual criminals.
Cleckley declared that the goal directed behavior in a psychopath is erratic and
illogical, sometimes they will throw away clearly beneficial opportunities and have an
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extremely poor ability to learn or profit by experience and absolutely do not react to
punishment. They are egocentric, and in object relations terminology are considered to
have an incapacity for object love, instead expressing ‘pseudo-love’ to others to achieve
personal gain. Along the same lines, Cleckley described these individuals as having an
overall poverty of affect, yet most have a keen ability to fake humor, angst, or passion.
They lack insight with no ability to see themselves as others see them or to know how
others feel when they see them. They lack ordinary responsiveness to kindness.
Cleckley mentioned that psychopaths also are prone to abusing alcohol and their sexual
relations lack the “desire to possess or ravish the partner emotionally.” Sexual activity is
usually casual to them. On the issue of whether or not one is a psychopath from birth,
Cleckley was unsure due to his personal observations of a “thorough psychopath” who
“was known intimately by the writer himself during years when he showed no traces of
abnormal behavior” (255). He suggested that psychopaths have an inability to follow a
life plan consistently, while ‘partial’ psychopaths can maintain fairly consistent and
successful outer lives, but his inner life usually maintains purposelessness. From
Cleckley’s observations, the psychopath may in fact go out of his way to fail in life and
rather pursues “social and spiritual self-destruction” (255).
Cleckley acknowledged that the etiology of psychopathy is inherently complex
and possibly more baffling to science and medicine that schizophrenia. He described
several possibilities for the genesis of psychopathy, including psychoanalytic, behavioral,
and psychobiological explanations. His explanation suggested that perhaps a better, more
specific term might be used to describe the cluster of symptoms and behaviors that make
up psychopathic personality: semantic dementia. He compared this term to semantic
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aphasia in which a patient may use words and descriptions in a grammatically correct
way that seem to be full of meaning, but in fact the meaning is not apparent to the patient.
Similarly, semantic dementia in Cleckley’s use of the phrase is used to describe
individuals who appear to be gleaning the emotional relevance and richness of life but in
fact are not. Psychodynamically, semantic dementia is regression from a rich and full life
to a level of less developed life, an existence which is marked by repeated social failure
and an unconscious working of the death instinct. Failure in psychopathy is actually a
necessity in the psychodynamic view, as there is a purpose for it. Additionally, there is a
fixation of the libido in an early stage of development resulting in conflict. There is
improper development of the id, ego, and superego resulting in an ever deepening pattern
of maladjustment.
Behaviorally, Cleckley described this inability to grasp the emotional relevance in
life as resulting from an improper conditioning of responses and suggests that both the
psychodynamic and behavioral views perhaps merge together, with the former being
simpler than the latter. Finally, Cleckley described potential psychobiological viewpoints
on the etiology of semantic dementia, or psychopathy referring to the work of
Sherrington (1934) and Ingham (1938). He suggested that Sherrington’s work on the
neurobiology of consciousness, which defined the meaningfulness of life in terms of
conscious awareness and the purposive behavior that comes from this awareness, would
shed light on the psychobiological factors associated with psychopathy. Sherrington
suggested that there are long circuits within the brain which are responsible for a normal
stimulus-organism-response process. The longer the neuronal path taken in this chain,
the more responses that will be integrated and the more past sensations and perceptions
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will be brought into awareness; presumably affect is part of this awareness process.
Cleckley suggested that those with the semantic dementia disorder perhaps do not benefit
from this chain and that the part of the neuronal pathway that contributes meaning to
psychobiological reactions is missing.
Ingham’s work (1938) was also mentioned by Cleckley as being an important
contribution to the psychobiological account for psychopathy. Ingham suggested that
growing pathways of neurons eventually develop into engrams in response to thoughts,
feelings, and behavior. In the psychopath, defective nerve networks are built up to a
point that even highly intelligent individuals have disordered behavior. More
specifically, he reported that in the psychopath, the defective nerve networks are most
likely to be found in the diencephalon, which was then known to be the main center for
emotional and instinctive drives. Ingham suggested that the ability to learn and profit
from experience promotes success of the instinctive impulses (e.g., possibly what is
known today as emotional learning or emotional intelligence). These impulses were
suggested to evolve into behavior that was adaptive to the environment at hand.
However, in psychopathy, this evolution of impulses was impaired. He postulated that it
is in the diencephalon where sensations are converted into meaning.
Cleckley suggested that the inability for the nerves in the diencephalon to grow
and diversify might have been due to a host of factors such as developmental anomalies,
heredity, somatic disease, and improper stimuli in the environment. Interestingly,
Cleckley, Ingham and Sherrington were not too far from the common neurobiological
theories of today which explain psychopathy in terms of a deficit in emotional
functioning (Blair, 2006, Patrick, 1994; Damasio, 1990) reflected in brain structures. Of
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course these writers lacked the sufficient laboratory techniques to pinpoint a more precise
location or the interaction of multiple brain structures that today has been written about
more extensively (Kiehl, 2006). However, their identification of the diencephalon was a
good initial guess about which neuroanatomical structures might be malfunctioning in a
psychopathic brain.
A criticism of Cleckley could be that he did not speculate enough on the
connections between the affective and behavioral symptoms of psychopathy. For
instance, his work did not explore whether psychopaths act in such asocial ways because
of their lack of empathy. Additionally, Cleckley overemphasized alcoholism in
psychopathy. Today alcoholism has little to do with the core features of the modern
construct. To his credit, he admitted in his section on treatment of psychopaths that they
in fact do not benefit from treatment, and that containment approaches were better
solutions.
Overall, Cleckley’s most important contribution to the understanding of
psychopathy was the organization of research that had been previously published as well
as the integration of that research with his clinical observations. His contributions
continued to be useful in guiding subsequent research. Importantly, his writings
introduced a key debate in the study and understanding of psychopathy: whether it is
best understood as a dichotomous or continuous construct. The attention he paid to
describing the partial psychopath suggested that today he might endorse psychopathy as a
continuous cluster of personality traits. Whether there is value in studying psychopathy
from the perspective that the relevant behavioral data come solely from clinical level or
total psychopath or come from individuals with partial manifestations of the syndrome as
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well is yet to be determined but is one of the foundational questions for this current study.
There was a departure in the exploration of the psychobiological characteristics of
psychopaths after Cleckley described Sherrington’s work. In general, the clinical
literature (at this point in time, there was no experimental literature on psychopathy) was
paying less attention to psychobiological matters and placing greater emphasis on
psychodynamic theories of psychopathy. The popularity of psychoanalysis took hold and
the neurophysiological approach to understanding psychopathy was not seriously
revisited until the late 1950’s with the work of Lykken.

Psychopathy Between Cleckley and Hare
Karpman (1941) approached the problem of psychopathy from a mid-twentieth
century psychodynamic viewpoint. Later works by Dawson (1952), Milbum (1954) and
Davidson (1956) continued to classify and describe psychopathy from this viewpoint.
Dawson (1952) suggested a difference between “aggressive psychopaths” and “passive
psychopaths.” Milbum (1954) in his address to the Weston State Hospital clinical faculty
gave a similar opinion to Dawson’s on the important characteristics of psychopathy. He
suggested that the primary deficit in psychopathy was emotional, suggesting that the
problem lay in a primitive emotional disorganization which overcomes judgment. He
suggested that heritable personality characteristics combine with cmcial environmental
factors (like faulty child-rearing) in order to affect the antisocial functioning of the
individual. Again, consistent with the popularity of psychoanalytic theory, Milbum
suggested that a possible cause of psychopathy was emotional deprivation in childhood
resulting in chronic deficiency in oral values. However, he admitted the need for further
research in the areas of psychophysiological functioning in these individuals.
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After reviewing the literature available to him, Davidson (1956) suggested that
the “central fact” of psychopathy was a core deficit in human affective functioning and
described it using the term oligothymia. He suggested that emotions were the motor end
of affectivity and that affectivity was projected on the brain. He referenced Papez’s
emotion circuit comprised of the septohippocampal system (SHC system) including the
hippocampus, the mammillary bodies, the anterior thalamic nuclei, and the cingulate
gyrus. This SHC loop was responsible for regulating the processing necessary for
generating emotional response. Davidson then suggested that there were two types of
affectivity within the brain, that which was thalamic and that which was cortical. He
implied that thalamic affectivity is intense and activates by way of a trigger resulting in
acting out behaviors. In contrast, cortical affectivity according to Davidson was affect
that was guided by choice or refusal. The former was thus more primitive than the latter.
His view of the core brain dysfunction in psychopathy was that there is a poverty of
affect originating somewhere in the cortico-thalamic pathway. This view was supported
by his observations of dysfunctional posterior temporal slow wave EEG patterns in
psychopaths.
Commensurate with the era, Davidson also explained how these biological
problems might manifest in psychodynamic terms. Davidson’s writings and observations
were a positive contribution to the understanding of psychopathy from a psychobiological
perspective and hinted at the plethora of research that was to come on the psychopath’s
brain. In particular, his research foreshadows Damasio and colleagues’ (1994) Somatic
Marker Hypothesis, which suggested interplay between emotion and the frontal lobe
facilitates emotion-informed decision making and behavior. The psychodynamic
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literature, while important to understand, was lacking in empirical support. It consisted
mainly of case studies involving psychodynamic constructs based on the interest of the
author (e.g., the death instinct). In contrast, the psychobiological approach, first hinted at
in Cleckley’s writings on Sherrington and Ingham, promised research that was
empirically based with variables that were quantifiable. Indeed, empirical research based
upon the characteristics of the psychopath as described by Cleckley was the aim of the
early psychophysiological research concerning psychopaths.
After Davidson, interest grew in looking at the functioning of a psychopath’s
emotions by observing physiological processes. Research embedded in the developing
emotion deficit theory of psychopathy attempted to first name the physiological
phenomena that were common to the disorder and then attempt to explain its causes.
From the late 1940’s through the early 1970’s different techniques for collecting
physiological data related to emotional responses arose with such methods as
electroencephalography (EEG) and galvanic skin response (GSR). Some examples of the
earliest research from this period had mixed results. For example, Linder (1942)
compared a group of mixed primary and secondary (neurotic) psychopaths with a group
of non-psychopathic criminal controls measuring skin resistance, heart rate, and
respiration rate and found no significant difference between groups either at rest or
during a simple conditioning task where tones were paired with shocks. Ruilmann &
Gulo (1950) had a similar design with the same types of subject groups. They induced
anxiety through having subjects perform arithmetic problems. Their results were similar
to Linder’s; however, in their study the mixed psychopathic group showed less galvanic
skin response. In subsequent years, results of studies investigating the physiological
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responses of primary and secondary psychopaths to a variety of stimuli continued to be
inconsistent (Tong, 1959; Fox and Lippert, 1963; Schachter & Latane, 1964; Goldstein,
1965; Lippert & Senter, 1966).
Lykken (1955) was the first to distinguish between Cleckley’s concepts of
primary and secondary (neurotic) psychopathy in an experimental design. He used an
empirically validated measure of psychopathy for classification of subjects in an
experiment with physiological variables. His measure of psychopathy was the
Psychopathic Deviate (Pd) scale on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI). In all, he studied three groups and found that when compared with controls,
primary and secondary psychopaths scored higher on the Pd scale. Primary psychopaths
showed significantly less anxiety as measured by self-report questionnaire, less GSR
reactivity to the aversive stimulus, and less avoidance of a punished response on a test of
avoidance learning than the control group. In contrast, neurotic psychopaths scored
significantly higher than either controls or primary psychopaths on the measures of selfreported anxiety. However, the classification of psychopathy in this study was based
upon a self-report instrument that is susceptible to manipulation and false portrayals by
the subjects who take it; both of these behaviors have been described clinically in the
literature as being inherent in psychopaths.

Hare and the Beginning of the Modern Era
In 1965, Robert Hare began a prolific research career which continues today. His
early work looked at the temporal gradient of fear arousal in psychopaths. He recorded
skin conductance from psychopathic, non-psychopathic and noncriminal controls. The
study was based on observations that the behavior of the psychopath appeared to be
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guided more by immediate events than those which might happen in the future. Hare
assumed that as the temporal remoteness of anticipated punishment increased, the amount
of fear elicited by punishment cues would be likely to decrease. Hare hypothesized that
the rate of decrease would likely be greater for psychopathic than for non-psychopathic
individuals and that the psychopath would be less likely to inhibit responses for which
anticipated punishment is far off into the future. Hare (1965a) had previously found that
skin conductance increased to an anticipated electric shock, calibrated to a level at which
the subject ‘indicated that he was unwilling to accept anything stronger,’ were found to
be related to scores on the Psychopathic Deviate (PD) scale of the MMPI. As the
application of the shock stimulus became imminent, subjects began to react later and
more slowly; however, this change varied with PD scores. Individuals with higher PD
scores slowed to a lesser degree than those with low PD scores.
Hare’s results indicated that the mean resting skin conductance of the
psychopathic group was significantly lower than the other groups. Additionally, during
subsequent trials the increase in conductance during the period just prior to shock (stimuli
4-7) was significantly smaller for the psychopathic group than for the other two groups.
Hare admitted that although the overall shock effects were smaller for psychopathic
individuals when compared to non-psychopathic individuals, they were not significantly
different when compared to the noncriminal control group. This suggested limited
support for the hypothesis that psychopaths are less responsive to noxious stimulation
than normal controls at that time. He presumed that cues associated with future
punishment were incapable of generating sufficient fear in the psychopath for immediate
behaviors to be inhibited.
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In 1976, House and Milligan studied autonomic responses to modeled distress in
prison psychopaths using the MMPFs PD scale as the psychopathy measure. They also
subdivided the group based on high and low Welsh Anxiety Scale (WAS) scores. During
the experiment, participants observed mild or severe distress to someone receiving an
electric shock while heart rate and skin conductance were measured. Results indicated
that low-Pd subjects were more autonomically responsive (e.g., slowed heart rate,
increased skin conductance) over the 15 trials than high Pd subjects. Also, higher selfreported anxiety as measured by the WAS was associated with increased autonomic
responsiveness in low-PD subjects. Interestingly, there was no effect for mild versus
severe distress.
In contrast to Hare (1965) and House and Milligan (1976), Mawson & Mawson
(1977) argued against the idea that a central characteristic of the psychopath was low
arousal. In their review of the literature, they formed the opinion that psychopaths
actually displayed a faster rate and greater magnitude of change in behavioral and
physiological activity than non-psychopaths. They suggested that the variability in the
psychopaths’ arousal levels might be the result of variations in neurotransmitter
functioning. Although isolated experiments may have independently suggested that the
key variable in psychopathy was low arousal, it appeared that there might be more to the
picture and that this issue would be more complex than originally anticipated.
Advances in emotion theory also characterized the late 1970’s with the
publication of Dickinson and Dearing’s theory (1979). It renamed the two opponent
motivational systems previously mentioned by Konorski (1967) as ‘aversive’ and
‘attractive,’ each activated by different unconditioned stimuli. This raised the possibility
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of differences in the psychopath’s behavior that could be accounted for by their
differential reactions to aversive and attractive stimuli. Furthermore, this research raised
the question of the relationship between motivated emotion and the psychopath’s
behavior. Lang’s group developed of a theory of motivated emotion (Lang, Bradley &
Cuthbert, 1990) based upon Konorski (1967) and Dickinson and Dearing (1979) that later
became relevant to research with the emotional characteristics of psychopaths (Patrick,
1994). This theory will be addressed following the discussion of the second important
development in psychopath classification, Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist.
The psychophysiological research in the post-Cleckley period was interesting but
as a whole, the results were mixed, inconclusive, or inconsistent. Hare reported that at
the time, there was inconsistency in findings of autonomic functioning in psychopathy
(e.g., findings that indicate autonomic hyperresponsivity, hyporesponsivity, and normal
responsivity to a variety of neutral and stressful stimuli). He suggested that
methodological differences between studies or differing criteria for selecting
psychopathic subjects might have been to blame for the inconsistent findings. He
reminded his readers that previous literature suggested individuals diagnosed as
psychopathic might be divided into two groups: primary and secondary psychopathy
(Karpman, 1961; Arieti, 1963). Mawson and Mawson (1977) suggested the psychopaths
might not have low arousal at all. Thus, the construct of psychopathy, as originally
suggested by Cleckley, began to appear more complex than could be assumed at first
glance. Hare was correct in his opinions on the early psychophysiological research and
was naturally inclined to create a more accurate way to define psychopathy. A benefit for
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research purposes would be an increased level of construct validity to future experiments
and the ability to generalize results on a larger scale.
At the close of the 1970’s, the need for diagnostic accuracy was impressed upon
the mental health community in part due to pressure from the court systems. If
psychopaths could not be effectively treated in mental hospitals and were a unique
problem in jails, it was necessary for clinicians to identify them accurately and
consistently. This accurate identification was also necessary for the advancement of
quality research. Hare (1968) had previously suggested that the primary psychopath was
known as the classical or true psychopath analogous to the clinical description of
Cleckley (1941). The primary psychopath was usually free of anxiety and guilt. The
secondary psychopath, in contrast was also known as the neurotic or pseudopsychopath
and was known to act-out in an antisocial manner with identifiable “neurotic
motivations” which probably translated into some sort of emotional quality inherent in
the actions of the secondary psychopath that would not likely be observed in the primary
psychopath.
Hare’s development of an assessment system based on the factors of psychopathy
originally put forth by Cleckley is known as the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL,1980) and
more recently, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991, 2003).
Offshoots of this measure have included a screening version (PCL-SV, Hart, Cox &
Hare, 1999) and a youth version designed to classify the unique characteristics of
children and adolescents with psychopathic traits (PCL-YV, Hare, Forth & Kosson,
1994). The PCL-R is set up as an interview. The content of the interview covers
Cleckley’s original constructs for psychopathy with some modifications. For example,
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whereas Cleckley suggested partial psychopathy, Hare’s system classifies the individual
into two categories, psychopathic or not psychopathic. The system also allows for
clinician input, such as determining levels of superficial charm based upon the
impressions of the interviewer. The PCL-R’s scoring mechanism places a cutoff score of
30 for the American version. Individuals scoring 30 or above are classified as
psychopaths. Hare’s construct, like Cleckley’s, takes into account behaviors as well as
the unique affective-interpersonal markers of psychopathy. Results of factor analyses
suggest evidence for two separate factors. Factor 1 accounts for the affectiveinterpersonal dimension and Factor 2 accounts for the behavioral manifestations. The
development of the PCL-R has been recognized as one of the more important
achievements in research and clinical practice, on par with Cleckley’s original
publication of the Mask ofSanity.

Psychopathy and the Theory ofMotivated Emotion
As previously mentioned, Lang’s group developed of a theory of motivated
emotion (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1990) that later became relevant to research with the
emotional characteristics of psychopaths (Patrick, 1994) and suggested that emotions
disposed the organism to either approach or avoid things in the environment. In the early
1980’s, research involved in the analysis and interpretation of event related potentials
(ERPs) shed some limited clarity on the characteristics of motivational behavior in
psychopaths. ERP research began as a computer analogy of the human information
processing system. ERP activity is commonly known as a manifestation of brain
activities that occur in preparation for or in response to discrete events that can be
internal or external to the subject (Fabiani, Gratton & Coles, 2000). ERP research allows
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for an alternate view of the stimulus-response processes that characterized the early
psychophysiological research on arousal.
Raine (1989) suggested that three main themes could be gathered together
concerning psychopathy and ERPs. First, evoked potential (EP) studies suggested a
dysfunctional arousal system at a parietal cortex/brainstem level in individuals with
psychopathy. Second, studies which looked at mid-latency EPs indicated that
psychopaths showed larger visual EP amplitudes at high intensity levels which might be
indicative of cortical augmenting. Third, when looking at the P3 wave in psychopaths,
Raine suggested that it was usually enhanced to task-relevant events. Raine’s view was
that the enhanced P3 was indicative of enhanced attention. Based upon these three
themes, Raine (1989) suggested that psychopathy was likely to be understood according
to both a sensation-seeking model as well as an information processing model based upon
P3 enhancement evidence. In other words, Raine suggested that psychopaths could have
abnormally large amounts of sensation seeking behavior. This finding partially fits in
with the theory of motivated emotion because it suggests psychopaths might have more
motivation to engage in events in their environment. However, it is limited in that the
information learned from the ERP evidence could not be more specific. For example, it
could not be made clear from Raine’s results whether psychopaths were apt to be
motivated to engage due to an excess or lack of emotional experience.
Jutai and Howard (1989) suggested that the idea of P3 enhancement being
indicative of enhanced attention processing in psychopaths was only partially correct.
They proposed an extended cortical immaturity hypothesis. Whereas Raine focused on a
tripartite division of evoked potentials (early, middle, late), Jutai and Howard suggested
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that psychopathy was better described as a cluster of chronic socially-deviant behavior
reflecting a maturational deficit. According to Jutai and Howard, psychopathy was a
deviation of personality that reflected deficits in cognitive appraisal processes rather than
a simple stimulus seeking orientation. In other words, psychopaths are not just aroused to
seek stimulation in the environment; they are aroused and have a different way of
interpreting the arousal which alters their perceived emotional experience. This
approach, they suggested, better encompassed the pathological sensation-seeking aspect
of psychopathy as well as accounted for the lack of moral reasoning and characteristic
style a psychopathic individual has with coping in interpersonal situations.
Jutai and Howard’s view of psychopathy was more comprehensive. Importance
was placed not on a single aspect of cognitive functioning (e.g., attention) but rather on
the understanding of the interaction of behavior and cognitive appraisal processes. As
such, future studies would need to be based on a more comprehensive theory that
included cognitive and emotional functioning based upon brain mechanisms. The theory
of motivated emotion developed by Lang and colleagues (Lang et al., 1990) attempted to
accomplish this through clarifying where the emotional deficit was located.
Patrick (1994) explained the disagreement in the psychopath arousal literature of
the 1960’s and 1970’s when he suggested that arousal was not a good index of fear. He
based this opinion on prior research concerned with lie detection in psychopaths (Patrick
& lacono, 1989). Instead, it was argued that an alternate physiological mechanism more
reliably represented emotional state. The fear circuit was a mechanism within the
broader context of specific pathways in the brain. Patrick suggested that further
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understanding of the fear circuit had the potential to expand, clarify, and augment the
information gained from the ERP research.
In brief, the fear circuit is a neural network that includes connections to the
brain’s motivational systems. Lang, Davis & Ohman (2000) suggested that this circuit
had been created early in the evolutionary history of humans. The pathways connect
primitive cortex, sub-cortex and mid-brain. Their purpose is suggested to be the
mediation of behaviors basic to survival. They are activated by unconditioned aversive
and appetitive stimuli in the environment and determine the mobilization of the organism,
reflexes, and approach/withdrawal behavior. The most essential component of the fear
circuit is the amygdala, which receives sensory information through the lateral and
basolateral nuclei. Following reception of stimuli, neuronal signals project to the central
nucleus of the amygdala and from there project to the hypothalamus, central gray, and
brainstem (Davis, 1992). Once stimulated, these pathways may lead to various fight or
flight behaviors, such as freezing or fleeing. Fear, according to Lang et al (2000) is a
preparatory state evoked by threat cues where the individual is mobilized and primed to
respond but not yet active. When a sudden stimulus is presented to an individual in this
state, an exaggerated startle reflex occurs.
The fear potentiated startle reflex was first described by Brown, Kalish, & Farber
in 1951. The primary acoustic startle pathway is described by Lang and colleagues
(2000) as beginning when soundwaves stimulate spiral ganglion cells in the cochlea,
which send signals to cochlear root neurons. These signals are then spread to the inferior
colliculus, passing through a synapse at the nucleus of the lateral lemniscus and
terminating at the nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis. At this point, signals project to
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motor neurons in the facial motor nucleus in the spinal cord. It is generally suggested
that the lateral nucleus of the amygdala provides a link for relaying auditory information
involved in fear conditioning to the amygdala (LeDoux, Cicchetti, Xagoraris &
Romanski, 1990).
Patrick (1994) found that psychopaths do not show normal enhancement of the
startle reflex during exposure to negative or aversive stimuli. These data indicated that
psychopathy was more closely associated with a deficit in fear rather than change in
arousal.
The startle probe was recommended by Patrick as an accurate way to verify
processing of fearful stimuli in psychopaths. Patrick observed a significant quadratic
pattern in which reflexes during both pleasant and unpleasant stimulation were
diminished when compared with neutral stimuli. Of particular interest to psychopathy
researchers at the time was the marked deficiency of reactions during the presentation of
fearful stimuli. Post-hoc analyses of the data indicated that the deviant startle patterns
between “mixed” psychopaths, or those with “moderately high” psychopathy (e.g.,
Cleckley’s partial psychopath, or secondary psychopath) and factor one primary
psychopaths were due to variations in emotional detachment (e.g., lack of empathy).
Following Patrick, more literature offered support for the fear deficit hypothesis.
Evidence for amygdala dysfunction in psychopathic individuals was found in functional
imaging studies (Kiehl, Smith, Hare, Mendrek, Forster, et al., 2001) and aversive
conditioning tasks (Veit, Flor, Erb, Hermann, Lotze, et al., 2002). Lesions of the
amygdala in normals was associated with impaired aversive conditioning (LaBar,
LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995) passive avoidance learning (Ambrogi-Lorenzini,
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Baldi, Bucherelli, Sacchetti, & Tassoni, 1999), augmentation of the startle reflex by
visual threat primes (Angrilli, Mauri, Palomba, Flor, Birbaumer, et al., 1996) and fearful
expression recognition (Blair, 2003a). Similarly, individuals with psychopathy showed
impairment in recognition of fearful expressions (Blair, Colledge, Murray & Mitchell,
2001), aversive conditioning (Flor, Birbaumer, Herman, Zeigler, & Patrick, 2002),
passive avoidance learning (Newman & Kosson, 1986), and augmentation of the startle
reflex by visual threat primes (Levenston, Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 2000).
The evidence for an atypical fear response in psychopaths is compelling and the
research is thorough. However, as Howard suggested (1989), the collection of
chronically deviant behaviors that psychopaths engage in is also likely to be influenced
by an atypical higher-order cognitive process. Although the theories are not currently
viable, both Ingham (1938) and Davidson (1956) had suggested psychopathic behavior
might be the result of atypical processing in the higher cortical centers. Ingham
commented on the connections between the brain’s executive and emotional centers
when he suggested that the human ability to learn and profit from experience promoted
success of the instinctive impulses. Davidson suggested that the core brain dysfunction
in psychopathy was a poverty of affect originating somewhere in the cortico-thalamic
pathway. Perhaps the most thorough explanation for psychopathic behavior would arise
from considering both an individual’s processing of fearful stimuli in their environment
as well as the extent to which their behaviors are moderated by frontal controls.

Psychopathy and the Somatic Marker Hypothesis
Toward the beginning of the 1990’s, neurobiological research began to focus on
comparisons between the behaviors of psychopathic individuals and behaviors of those
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with frontal lobe damage. A classic example of behavioral change due to this type of
injury was Phineas Gage, a railroad worker whose accident resulted in a traumatic brain
injury severing the pathways between the orbitofrontal cortex and limbic circuits
(Harlow, 1848). The resulting disinhibition syndrome was observed in many other
patients with damage to their frontal lobes and has been given the name “frontal lobe
syndrome.” According to Mesulam (2002), prefrontal lesion patients can exhibit a
remarkable diversity but present in two generally recognized subtypes, a frontal abulic
syndrome and frontal disinhibition syndrome. Of interest to research in psychopathy
were the similarities between psychopathy and frontal disinhibition. The anterior part of
the superior temporal gyrus is connected to the frontal lobes (Petrides & Pandya, 2002).
Disruptions in this pathway might contribute to the emotional abnormalities inherent in
psychopathy. It extends rostrally from the anterior superior temporal gyrus running as
part of the uncinate fasiculus and terminates in the orbitofrontal cortex. This pathway is
thought to be important in normal regulation of emotional responses to stimuli in the
environment, especially auditory stimuli. Emotional stimuli are relevant to this pathway
because of direct limbic-medial frontal connections to the amygdala (Aggleton, 1992).
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio (1990) observed that damage to the ventromedial
frontal corticies in adults with previously normal personalities resulted in defects in
decision-making and planning that were revealed in abnormal social conduct. They
proposed that the defect was due to an inability to activate somatic (e.g., “feeling”) states
linked to punishment and reward. They proposed that in normal individuals, these states
are experienced in association with specific social situations and are activated in
connection with anticipated outcomes of response options. They developed a theory
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known as the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), which states that emotions and
feelings have specific, consistent effects upon executive decision making (Bechara,
Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). This theory offered one explanation for the altered
personalities and the “acquired sociopathy” of those suffering from ventromedial
prefrontal lesions.
Damasio’s group reported that it was possible that the failure to reactivate these
somatic markers would likely deprive the individual of an autonomic ‘device’ that would
signal the ultimately negative consequences that would likely bring immediate reward.
They proposed that whereas correct activation of these somatic markers would force
attention to future negative consequences, in individuals with ventromedial frontal
damage, autonomic responses to socially meaningful stimuli were abnormal, suggesting
non-activation or incorrect activation of the somatic markers. The original observations
made by Cleckley suggested that psychopaths had similar deficits: erratic goal directed
behavior and a poor ability to learn or profit by experience. He also contended that
psychopaths did not react to punishment. As such, Damasio’s group suspected that the
deficits observed in psychopaths might have similar neurological origins to their
ventromedial patients.
Losel & Schmucker (2004) tested the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) with
individuals who were determined to be psychopaths after being administered the PCL-R
(Hare, 1991). They reasoned that since the SMH suggested individuals act according to
emotional markers acquired at a very young age, the markers function automatically.
They further suggested that this would allow the individual using them to make quick
decisions based upon a subjective feeling. The standard method to measure the Somatic

30
Marker Hypothesis in the laboratory is through the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The task
was formulated to simulate real life decision making under conditions where the
individual theoretically feels varying levels of risk. Dysfunctions in the emotional
markers lead to poor results on the gambling task and increased risky decision making.
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Anderson, 1994) Their objectives were to test the
relation between psychopathy and risk taking in the gambling task, to determine how
individual differences in attention might moderate the relationship between success in the
gambling task and psychopathy, and to determine whether these hypotheses could be
generalized to everyday punishment learning. They measured IGT performance to test
the SMH, and had the subjects perform a visual discrimination/ cancellation task as a
measure of sustained attention (Brickenkamp & Zillmer, 1998). The sample was
dichotomized according to attention performance using a median split. Participants
scoring above the median score on the attention task were referred to as attentive and the
others were considered inattentive. Statistically, the attentive subjects did not differ from
their inattentive subjects on PCL-R total or factor scores. What Losel and Schmucker
found was attention capacity as measured by the performance on the visual
discrimination task moderated the performance of the psychopathic group. One group of
psychopathic participants had significantly poorer attention performance as well as
deficits in the gambling task as measured by significantly increased numbers of risky
choices. A second group of psychopaths had significantly less risky choices and
significantly better attention functioning. In the group of non-psychopathic participants
attention had no significant impact on gambling task performance. The authors
suggested that it was possible that highly attentive psychopaths may have been able to
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compensate for any ventromedial functional deficits because they were able to focus
more closely on the task. These findings suggest evidence for individual differences
between individuals within the psychopath category. Evidence for individual differences
suggests that alternative ways to describe psychopathy that move beyond the discrete
categories could be useful.
Van Honk, Hermans, Putman, Montagne et al. (2002) tested the relationship
between psychopathic personality and the SMH among subjects scoring in the low and
high distribution tails of a measure of psychopathic behavioral characteristics in a rather
large sample (n = 525). They used Carver and White’s (1994) self-report measure to
distinguish between high and low psychopathy. The measure was based upon Gray’s
theory of the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and Behavioral Inhibition System
(BIS) (Gray, 1991). Briefly, Gray proposed that the BAS is a positive feedback system
associated with reward and guides the organism toward its goal for survival, thus the
animal orients itself toward a stimulus. In contrast, the BIS is a system that is activated
by aversive stimuli that eventually causes a termination of the ongoing behavior, an
increase in arousal, and an increase in attention. The mechanism, according to Gray,
involves a comparator system within the septohippocampal area which he believed could
continually predict the next likely event and compare the prediction to the actual event.
If a mismatch was detected, the BIS would terminate the behavior. The ‘parameter
value’ hypothesis stated that the operating characteristics of the BIS and BAS determine
patterns of emotion which influences behavior in each individual. Gray added another
basic assumption about the major dimensions in personality: personalities vary in the
individual as a result of each individual’s unique emotional system activity. The
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BIS/BAS motivational systems both serve to increase general arousal and are reciprocally
related such that activation of one inhibits the activation of the other. Lykken (1995)
suggested that primary psychopathy was associated with an average BAS and a
hyporeactive BIS while secondary psychopathy was associated with a hyperreactive BAS
and an average BIS.
In Van Honk et al (2002) subjects with extremely high levels of behavioral
activation and extremely low levels of behavioral inhibition were suggested to be more
psychopathic, whereas subjects with extremely high levels of behavioral inhibition and
extremely low levels of behavioral activation were suggested to be less psychopathic.
The low psychopathic subject group showed intact punishment learning. The researchers
suggested that somatic markers likely guided these subjects’ decisions during the Iowa
Gambling Task. The high psychopathic group did not show punishment learning, similar
to the behavior of orbitofrontal patients.
The above studies with the Iowa Gambling Task suggested that clinical level
psychopaths differentiated by the PCL-R as well as individuals with certain subclinical
psychopathic personality traits (behavioral activation, or tendency to be fearless) both
performed poorly on the Iowa Gambling Task, implying that they may have deficient
somatic markers. At this time, there has been no research published concerning other
measures of subclinical psychopathy, which would add further credibility to the
conclusions drawn from Van Honk’s group.

Dimensional and Categorical Viewpoints
The study by Ldsel and Schmucker is an example of experimental research that
views psychopathy from a purely categorical perspective. Using the PCL-R, they
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determined that each subject would either represent psychopathy or would not. In
contrast, Van Honk and colleagues used a more dimensional perspective. While still
using groups, their study acknowledged that subclinical psychopathic traits could exist on
a continuum. Alongside the already vast body of experimental literature that continued to
accumulate throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s, a new post-PCL-R branch of thought was
forming that concerned itself with how to best classify psychopaths. As previously
discussed, the debate concerning whether to view psychopathy as a continuous
(dimensional) or dichotomous (taxonic) construct was begun by Cleckley in his work The
Mask of Sanity. He described psychopathy as complex and varied. As early
psychophysiological research confirmed, it would be difficult to pinpoint one criterion
that would assure an accurate classification. Post-development of the PCL-R, the
taxonic/dimensional debate continued (Harris, Rice & Quinsey, 1994). Currently, the
PCL-R operates on the premise that psychopathy is a taxonic construct. This means that
one is categorized as either a psychopath or a non-psychopath based on a cutoff score.
Since a clinical diagnosis of psychopathy based on the PCL-R can either be or not be
based on a cutoff score, the question arises as to the difference between for example, a
score of 29 and a score of 10. If psychopathy is dimensional, differing levels of
psychopathic traits could be hypothesized to exist in a random sample of individuals from
an ordinary community. The so called “non-criminal” psychopath has been the subject of
research from various angles: genetic, personality, cognitive and emotional research has
been conducted based on the principle of dimensionality in psychopathy. Typically when
one is referring to a non-criminal psychopath, one describes an individual “with
psychopathic traits.” Returning to Cleckley’s “partial psychopath,” one begins to wonder
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if there is utility in also studying psychopathy among the undiagnosed. In fact, various
community measures have been developed to trace such traits. The extent to which the
neurological and behavioral traits of clinical psychopaths and individuals with subclinical levels of psychopathic personality traits are similar or different has not been fully
determined, and will be addressed in the current experiment.
Although PCL-R defined psychopathy is the gold standard in the field today, a
subset of psychopathy research has turned in a new direction (e.g., Edens, Marcus,
Lilienfeld & Poythress, 2006) looking at the traits of a psychopathic personality within
community samples of non-incarcerated adults and children. Several studies using both
the PCL-R (Hare, 1991) and the PCL-YV (Forth, Kosson & Hare, 2003) have shown that
adolescent offenders with psychopathic traits differ from other antisocial youth in that
they commit more violent acts both in the community and while institutionalized
(Vincent, Vitacco, Grisso & Corrado, 2003; Kosson, Cyterski, Steuerwald, Neumann &
Walter-Matthews, 2002; Brandt, Kennedy, Patrick & Curtain, 1997). Interestingly, Frick
& Hare (2001) developed a screening measure for the presence of psychopathic traits
called the Antisocial Process Screening Device (ASPD). Studies utilizing this measure
indicate that a subgroup of antisocial adolescents exists with a more aggressive and
severe pattern of behavior problems when compared to other children with general
conduct problems (Enebrink, Andershed & Langstrom, 2005; Caputo, Frick & Brodsky,
1999).
It is assumed that learning about the development, interaction, variation, and
unique characteristics of psychopathic traits may continue to reveal insights into
treatment options for individuals with psychopathy. Widom (1977) is arguably the first

35
researcher to study psychopathy in community samples. He used Robins’ (1966) criteria
for sociopathy to measure psychopathic traits in a sample of 28 participants from the
community and found the sample showed characteristics such as heavy alcohol use,
substance abuse, and persistent criminal behavior. Noticeably absent from these findings
are any sort of personality traits that tie in to the affective component of Hare’s Factor 1.
Harris, Rice & Quinsey (1994) addressed the debate on whether the construct of
psychopathy was taxonic or dimensional. They conducted a taxometric analysis to the
scores of prisoners on the PCL. Their findings suggested that antisocial behaviors (e.g.,
stealing, fire setting in childhood, harming animals) originated from a latent taxon
whereas the core features of the psychopathic personality (e.g., remorseless, cold, lack of
empathy) originated from a latent dimension. Marcus, Edens, & Lilienfeld (2004)
showed no confirmation that either Factor 1 or Factor 2 psychopathy was taxonic.
Widiger (2001) suggested that taxometric analysis itself did not take into account the
varying behavior patterns, beliefs or cognition within a taxon that could be better
understood as variations along an underlying dimension. The proponents of the
dimensional view hoped to build upon and expand Hare’s classification system.
Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld & Poythress (2006) further addressed the debate in
their paper, which examined the latent structure of psychopathy using taxometric
procedures developed by Meel & Yonce (1994, 1996). The results offered no support for
psychopathy as a taxonic construct. In a study conducted by DeMatteo, Heilbrun &
Marczyk (2006) the construct of psychopathy was investigated using the PCL-R in a
general population sample. The rationale behind this study was the authors’ perspective
that there was not much research examining psychopathy among community samples and
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that what was known about psychopaths who have avoided interactions with the criminal
justice system is very little. They argued that empirical evidence for the “psychopaths
among us” had been lacking. Also argued was that studying psychopathy in younger
populations was often fruitless because the incidence of the traits is expected to be low.
Participants in DeMatteo and colleagues’ study were recruited in such a way as to
increase the chances of gathering a sample with moderate psychopathic personality traits.
The researchers developed an advertisement that used the characteri stics of psychopathy
in a non-pejorative manner. Subjects exhibited the personality features of psychopathy
(Factor 1) to a greater extent than the behavioral features (Factor 2). A moderate
percentage of the sample (40%) reported no history of involvement with the criminal
justice system, yet these participants exhibited moderately elevated PCL-R scores. The
results of this study suggest evidence for psychopathy as a continuous construct. Also
suggested was that psychopathic personality traits could be present within a group of
individuals without involvement in the criminal justice system. As can be seen by this
exploratory study, an increase in research on the characteristics and classification of
subclinical psychopathy would perhaps clarify the boundaries between criminal and non
criminal orientations. The subsequent development of the Psychopathic Personality
Inventory (PPI) by Lilienfeld resulted from this research on the dimensionality of the
construct. The PPI was a self-report measure that is useful in studying the factor one
contributions to psychopathic personality in community samples.
The interest in studying psychopathy in the community has yielded some
interesting findings regarding the prevalence of traits. It has been proposed that to a large
extent, successful psychopaths are the ones who do not get caught by law enforcement,
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the ones who evade detection, and the ones who generally fool society into believing that
they are productive members when in fact they are actually profiting and gaining on
others’ losses. The emotional disability that is the hallmark of the psychopath is less
likely to require incarceration for these individuals. Like other personality patterns both
maladaptive and adaptive, it has been proposed that psychopathic personality might have
developmental trajectory.
The literature has laid an ample foundation for those who venture into
psychopathy research today. It began with the observations of physicians more than a
century ago. These physicians, through communications in the literature, began to see
that there were many similarities within the group known as the “morally insane.” Next,
a volume was produced on the subject (Cleckley, 1941) that illustrated in depth what a
psychopath was and called for a new classification scheme. Soon after, researchers
became intrigued by the physiological differences observed when a psychopathic
individual was placed in an “emotional” situation. Psychopathy research evolved
alongside various theories of the psychophysiology of emotion such as the aversive and
appetitive theory of Dickenson & Dearing (1979). Robert Hare, in his early years (1968)
called for a distinction of psychopathy in terms of the primary and secondary psychopath.
He did this after observing inconsistent methodology in the prior studies on the
autonomic functioning of psychopaths. Later, the shift moved toward studying
autonomic functioning within social contexts, most commonly in situations of aggression.
With the advent of newer equipment to study the brain, experimental research with
psychopaths broadened to include measuring event-related brain potentials in relationship
to specific experimental events, shedding light on attention and cognition. Difficulties in
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attention functioning were debated in the literature, highlighting the first time a cognitive
function without emotion was studied in psychopathy.
Alongside the development of more sophisticated measures for looking at both
the brain and other physiological measures relevant to psychopathy, Hare was developing
the PCL and later the PCL-R. The development of this measure lent some consistency to
classification of psychopaths for research and clinical purposes. Working with
neurological patients, Damasio and colleagues observed similarities in behavior between
those with injuries in the frontal lobe and psychopaths. Imaging techniques such as fMRI
and PET were being developed at this time ushering a whole new era in brain research for
psychopathy. Damasio proposed the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) in relationship
to psychopathy originally termed “acquired sociopathy.” Patrick’s work (1994) offered
evidence for psychopathy as a dysfunction in the fear system. His series of experiments
embedded the abnormal physiological findings of the psychopath (e.g., reduced startle in
negative picture conditions) within a neural network theory of emotion which relied
heavily on the proper functioning of the amygdala to augment the production of a
properly augmented startle reflex. After this research, others had gone on to report that
psychopathy was not just a disorder of the fear emotion, but potentially a disorder
involving multiple frontal-limbic connections (Kiehl, 2006). While this explosion of
brain research in the psychopath was occurring, separate research fields have looked at
the development of psychopathy as well as new ways to measure psychopathic traits
within community samples on the premise that psychopathy is a dimensional rather than
taxonic construct. Presumably, the ability to measure psychopathy in community
samples will allow a wider variety of methods to be used and a wider variety of
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investigators access to subjects. Additionally, future longitudinal studies on the
development of psychopathy would more easily be addressed through community sample
research. As might be concluded from this discussion, the extent to which the
neurological and behavioral characteristics of clinical psychopaths and individuals with
sub-clinical psychopathic traits are similar or different requires further clarification.

Specific Aims
In this study, the aim was to investigate both cognitive and psychophysiological
outcomes in a sample with variations in sub-clinical psychopathic personality traits as
measured by the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised. While clinically defined
psychopaths require a certain score on the PCL-R, individuals have been found to have
psychopathic personality traits at a sub-clinical level (Patrick, Poythress, Benning, Edens
& Lilienfeld, 2006; Lilienfeld & Benning, 2006; Benning, Patrick, Salekin & Leistico,
2005; Gordon, Baird & End, 2004; Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen & Krueger, 2003;
Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld & Cade, 2002; Lilienfeld, 1998; Edens & Lilienfeld,
1998). These traits have so far been identified through reliable and valid measures such
as the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) and more
recently the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised (PPI-R, Lilienfeld & Widows,
2005). The PPI and PPI-R have been used to refine the construct of psychopathy for
research (Lilienfeld, 1998, Patrick, Edens, Poythress, Lilienfeld & Benning, 2006),
clinical (Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen & Krueger, 2003) and risk assessment purposes
(Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld & Cade, 2003). The theory behind the PPI suggests
that psychopathic traits can fall on a continuum (Benning, Patrick, Salekin & Leistico,
2005) and may be maladaptive, independent from the syndrome. The research using the
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PPI-R is based upon the assumption that as the understanding of psychopathic personality
traits in the normal population increases, the likelihood of further understanding clinical
psychopathy will increase.
The previous discussion has covered two main areas concerning clinical
psychopathy (and to a limited extent sub-clinical psychopathy). First, research has been
dedicated to establishing who psychopaths are and who they are not (Hare, 1991, 1993,
2006; Patrick et al, 2006; Lilienfeld & Benning, 2006; Benning et al, 2005). This
research has improved our classification of these individuals through observations of
their behaviors in the environment. Second, extensive research has been dedicated to
clarifying what makes these individuals do what they do (Patrick, 1994; LaPierre, Braun
& Hodgins, 1995; Laakso, Vaurio, Koivisto et al., 2001; Miller & Rosenfeld, 2003;
Benning, Patrick & lacono, 2005; Larsson, Andershed & Lichtenstein, 2006 and Kiehl,
2006). This research body collectively attempts to explain the physical basis for the
traits.
The specific aims for this project were to investigate the behavior of individuals
with varying levels of psychopathic personality traits. The specific behaviors
investigated were twofold: 1) The physiological reactions of these individuals in an
emotion-modulated startle reflex experiment and 2) their usage of somatic markers to
guide decision making behavior. It was expected that individuals who self-report higher
degrees of psychopathic personality patterns would differentiate themselves based upon
these tasks.
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Research Questions
Based on the current body of research in psychopathy, the following research
questions concerning individuals who have psychopathic personality traits were explored:
First, it was of interest to verify Patrick’s fear deficit hypothesis with a community
sample of individuals with psychopathic personality traits. Specifically, the effect of
different types of images designed to evoke various emotions on startle response
magnitude was investigated. Positive, neutral, and threatening images, and images of
humans in distress were used in order to verify previous findings: individuals with higher
levels of psychopathic personality traits tended to have lower average startle response
magnitudes when experiencing distressing, negative emotions rather than fear-based
emotions (Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997). Second, it was of interest to explore the
relationship between psychopathic personality and an individual’s use or non-use of
somatic markers to guide risky decision making behavior. Specifically, the individual’s
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was used. The literature has suggested
that higher levels of psychopathic personality associated with reduced performance on
the IGT, implying that these individuals have reduced capacity to utilize somatic markers.

Method

Subjects
Based on power analysis for medium effect size, (Cohen et ah, 1988) the goal was
to recruit 85 subjects. A total of 85 subjects participated in this study. Four subjects
were lost due to equipment problems. After data screening and considering missing data,
81 subjects were entered into the measurement of emotion modulated startle (average
maximum blink magnitude). These data were processed and scored with PSYLAB 8
(Contact Precision Instruments, London, UK) analysis software. Eighty-one subjects
were entered into the repeated measures analysis investigating differences in average
maximum startle magnitude among valence categories. These 81 subjects were also
entered into the analysis correlating average maximum magnitude data and personality
data as well as the analysis correlating personality data with data from the Iowa
Gambling Task data. Demographic data are presented in Table 1 for the sample that
underwent all three analyses. Subjects were undergraduate students at or above age 18
recruited from The California State University, San Bernardino. Recruitment method
followed a standardized protocol for human subject research at CSUSB. Participants
signed up for 5 extra credit points for participation. As a component of the informed
consent process, each participant signed a written informed consent document indicating
they understood the procedure including the risks and benefits of participation.

Emotion Modulated Startle
Evidence of emotional response deficits has been observed in startle reflex
experiments (Patrick, 1994). Further refinement of psychophysiological research with
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Table 1
Sample Demographic Data
N
Average Age
% Caucasian
% Hispanic
% African American
% Asian
% Other

Males
15

Females
66
23.8
38
38

27.3
33
47

13

20
4
0

7
0

psychopaths revealed that the type of stimulus used to evoke the emotional response
seems to make a difference as well. In particular, negative images depicting humans in
distress have resulted in subdued startle magnitudes in these individuals (Blair, Jones,
Clark & Smith, 1997). Keeping with the assumption that patterns of clinically
psychopathic behavior could be found in individuals with sub-clinical psychopathic
personalities, it would be expected that individuals with sub-clinical psychopathy would
also have is reduced startle magnitude in situations involving distress cues.
Stimuli. Visual stimuli were pictures selected from the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) on the basis of the normed
affective valence ratings. Each picture (Appendix A) was selected on the basis of its
membership in the positive, negative, or neutral category. A fourth category was also
included that consisted of images of human beings in distress according to previous
research (Blair et al, 1997). Three criteria were used to place an image in the distress
category: first, the slide contained an image of one or more human beings, second, the
humans depicted in the slide all displayed visible facial expressions, and third, these
facial expressions were rated as negative. So that the three emotion conditions were
43
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represented validly, pictures rated most negative, most positive, and most neutral were
selected. Additionally, positive and negative pictures that were most arousing and neutral
pictures that were not arousing were selected, to increase the potential for each emotion
to be more accurately represented during the experiment. Similarly, pictures in the
distress category were selected if they had relatively high valence (negative) and arousal
ratings. Based on prior research by Lang et al., (1993) 44 pictures, (11 from each valence
category) were selected. Mean normative arousal and valence scores for each of the four
categories are presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Mean normative arousal and valence scores for visual stimuli.
Positive

Neutral

Negative

Distress

Mean Arousal

6.60

3.41

6.55

5.59

Mean Valence

7.24

4.98

2.30

2.48

Note. Ratings are scored on a 9-point scale such that 9 represents a high rating on each dimension (i.e.,
high pleasure, high arousal), and 1 represents a low rating on each dimension (i.e., low pleasure, low
arousal.)

Auditory stimuli were presented binaurally through headphones (TDK 49) with
each headphone covering the entire ear. Auditory stimuli were 50 ms bursts of white
noise, each at 100 dB (A). Startle responses were elicited on trials 1-3, 7-8, 10-12, 14,
16-18, 20, 22, 24-25, 27-30, 34, 36, 38, and 40-44 by the white noise stimulus presented
randomly at either 4.5 or 5.5 seconds after picture onset. Picture stimuli were presented
without a startle probe on trials 4-6, 9, 13, 15, 19, 21, 23, 26, 31-33, 35, 37, and 39 for a
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total of 16 trials. This design resulted in 7 positive, 7 negative, 7 distress and 7 neutral
pictures probed for a startle response, 28 in total.

Psychophysiological Measures
All physiological data were collected using the Psylab system (Contact Precision
Instruments, London, UK). Each subject was asked to look upwards while two electrodes
were attached under the right eye. The center of each electrode was placed
approximately 12-13 mm apart. A third ground electrode was placed on the dorsal side
of the subject’s left hand. Electromyogram (EMG) waveforms from orbicularis oculi
were first bandpass filtered online between 1 and 100 Hz, then digitized (16 bit) and
recorded at 1000 samples per second.

Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised
A computerized version of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised (PPIR) was created in E-Prime version 2.0 Beta. Previous research has supported the validity
of a computerized version of this instrument (Sandler, 2007). In this study, a total of 124
respondents participated. Scores on all 15 of the PPI-R scales were found to be similar,
as were all internal scale consistencies. Test-retest reliabilities for scores on the PPI-R
Overall Total, Factors, and Content scales ranged from r = .76 (Coldheartedness) to r =
.93 (PPI-R Total). The PPI-R has been used to refine the construct of psychopathy for
research (Lilienfeld, 1998, Patrick, Edens, Poythress, Lilienfeld & Benning, 2006),
clinical (Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen & Krueger, 2003) and risk assessment purposes
(Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld & Cade, 2003). The theory behind the PPI-R
suggests that psychopathic traits can fall on a continuum (Benning, Patrick, Salekin &
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Leistico, 2005) and may be maladaptive, independent from the syndrome. The research
using the PPI-R is based upon the assumption that as the understanding of psychopathic
personality traits in the normal population increases, the likelihood of further
understanding clinical psychopathy will increase. The PPI-R provided data (T-scores) for
eight content scales, two validity scales, three factor scales, and one total scale.
Instructions dictated to the subject as well as selected example questions from the PPI-R
are provided in Appendix B.

The Iowa Gambling Task
A computerized version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was administered to all
subjects on a Dell Inspiron El405 laptop. The IGT was developed as an empirical way to
measure risky decision making and is based upon the Somatic Marker Hypothesis
(SMH). The SMH is based upon the assumption that humans who make decisions in
risky situations usually have the ability to select the safest and most efficient means of
reaching a goal. Theoretically, they are guided by cues from their emotional networks,
manifested as bodily sensations. These bodily sensation representations are termed
somatic markers. Using somatic markers effectively minimizes risk and maximizes
reward (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000). Damasio and colleagues began to observe
deficits in a task designed to mimic risky decision making situation in their prefrontal
patients. Research with this task, called the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) shows that
orbitofrontal patients have reliably demonstrated poor outcome (Bechara et al., 2000).
Previous research with non-clinical psychopaths suggests that they exhibit similar
impairments on the task although they have not experienced direct brain injury (van
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Honk, Hermans, Putman, Montagne & Schutter, 2002; Losel & Schmucker, 2004; Blair
et al, 2006).

Procedure
After providing informed consent, subjects were seated at the computer. The first
task they were asked to complete was the PPI-R. They were specifically instructed to
answer each of the 154 questions, which could describe opinions, likes, dislikes, feelings,
etc., in a way that generally best described them. Each item consisted of a four choices:
false, mostly false, mostly true, or true. Upon completion of the PPI-R, subjects were
asked to complete the Iowa Gambling Task. Briefly, each subject was seated at the
computer and asked to select from one of four decks of playing cards, as depicted on the
screen. To select the card, they used the laptop’s touchpad. Each selection resulted in a
“win,” defined as an increase in monetary earnings, or a “loss,” defined as a loss in
monetary earnings. Subjects kept track of their net earnings by two bars on the top of the
screen, which either increased or diminished depending upon the subject’s performance.
Subjects were told that they would start with $2,000 credit. They were given the
instruction to not try to figure out what the computer was doing, but to keep in mind that
some decks were worse than others. They were also told that any decision on what to do
with the money should be made as if they were using their own money. A full transcript
of the directions read to each subject is provided in the Appendix D.
Next, the electrodes were attached and subjects underwent a startle habituation
and pre-pulse inhibition task (results not presented here) followed directly by the emotion
modulated startle reflex procedure. A second habituation phase preceded the emotion
modulated startle phase of the experiment. A neutral pattern was presented on the screen,
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and each subject was instructed to fix their gaze on the screen. In total, six startle probes
were presented during this phase. Subjects were told that an occasional noise on the
headphones would be heard, but to ignore it. Next, the subject was presented with an
instruction slide that told them to imagine while they were viewing each image that they
were encountering what was in the picture. Each trial began with the onset of a picture
that was presented for 6 seconds on a computer screen in front of the subject. Each
picture was presented in a pseudo-random order; a random sequence within each category
was produced at the initiation of data collection and revised every 20 subjects.

Design and Data Preparation
Psychophysiological data (average maximum blink magnitude). Using analysis
routines in Psylab, the EMG data for each trial were rectified and the maximum blink
amplitude within a window from 20 ms to 100 ms after the stimulus onset was recorded.
The difference between this maximum and the mean of the 200 ms prestimulus baseline
was scored as the blink magnitude for the trial. All data were reviewed for missing
trials. After this review, four subjects’ data were discarded due to an excess of missing
trials. Each subject’s raw blink magnitude score across the four valence categories was
then normalized by conversion to a T-score. Outliers were defined as those subjects with
scores greater than three standard deviations above or below the mean (T > 80; T < 20).
Data from the four subjects with unusable EMG waveforms and three outliers were
replaced with the mean average maximum blink magnitude value for each category.
Each valence category was analyzed in SYSTAT version 11 for homogeneity of variance.
Normality, skewness, and kurtosis were analyzed with histograms. All values fell into
appropriate ranges. The final T-scores within each of four categories (positive, neutral,
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negative and distress) for each subject was used for the primary analyses. Additional
analyses exploring the effects of gender on individuals who scored in the upper or lower
third of the sample were conducted, so the data for each valence category was sorted into
either the High or Low range based upon a median split. Those with the highest startle
magnitudes in each of the four valence conditions were classified as High (e.g., High
Distress, High Threat, etc.) The procedure was repeated for those with the lowest startle
magnitudes resulting in a total of eight new categorical variables for the gender analysis.
PPI-R. The PPI-R data consisted of T-scores for each of the eight content scales,
three factor scales, two validity scales, and one total scale. Outliers were defined as those
subjects with scores greater than three standard deviations above or below the mean (T >
80; T < 20). Review of the PPI-R T-scores revealed no significant outliers. All data
were analyzed in SYSTAT version 11 for homogeneity of variance. Normality, skewness,
and kurtosis were analyzed with histograms. All values fell into appropriate ranges. The
PPI-R did not produce output for several subjects and the data for these individuals (n=3)
was replaced with the mean T-score for each scale. Additional analyses exploring the
effects of gender on individuals who scored in the upper or lower third of the sample
were conducted, so the data for each valence category was sorted into either the High or
Low range based upon a median split. For the personality variables, this step created 16
groups from the original 8 Subscales (e.g., High Coldheartedness and Low
Coldheartedness, etc.). It also created 4 groups from the original two Factor Scales (e.g.,
High Fearless Dominance, Low Fearless Dominance, etc.). Additionally, the PPI-R Total
Scale Score was split into High and Low.
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Iowa gambling task. The IGT program tracked performance at five distinct
intervals throughout 100 trials (Netl-5). Additionally, a total performance score was
obtained based on each subject’s overall performance (Total). The program converted
these six types of scores into T-scores. Outliers were determined to be those subjects
with scores greater than three standard deviations above or below the mean (T > 80; T <
20). Review of the IGT T-scores revealed no significant outliers. All data were analyzed
in SYSTAT version 11 for homogeneity of variance. Normality, skewness, and kurtosis
were analyzed with histograms. All values fell into appropriate ranges. One subject was
missing output, which was replaced with the mean T-score for each scale. Additional
analyses exploring the effects of gender on individuals who scored in the upper or lower
third of the sample were conducted, so the data for each valence category was sorted into
either the High or Low range based upon a median split. The Iowa Total T-Score was
split into High and Low resulting in the creation of two new categorical variables.

Results

Research Question 1: Emotion Modulation of the Startle Reflex
To determine if viewing pictures from positive, neutral, negative and distress
valence categories produced effects on the average maximum magnitude of the startle
response, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. The 4-level withinsubjects factor was defined as valence category. Variables were entered in the following
order based upon the a priori hypothesis: positive, neutral, negative, and distress. No
significant linear or quadratic trends were found across the valence categories in the
predicted direction. As the neutral valence category was found to be significantly greater
than the other three categories, a separate analysis was conducted with the remaining
three variables to ascertain differences between the emotion conditions. A second one
way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. The 3-level within-subjects factor was
again defined as valence category. A significant quadratic trend was found across the
remaining valence categories F (1,80) = 5.13, p < .03 (Figure 1) indicating that the mean
startle response was smallest in the distress picture condition and greater in the positive
and negative picture conditions. This trend did not fall in the original predicted linear
direction.
A closer look at the mean normative arousal ratings of the selected visual stimuli
in the positive, negative, and distress conditions revealed that distressing images were
rated as significantly less arousing than negative (t = -3.87; p < 0.001) and positive (t = 3.07; p < 0.02) images (Figure 2). There was a similarity between the quadratic trend
observed with the emotion modulated startle response and the general pattern of arousal.
The less arousing images of individuals in distress elicited the smallest eye-blink
51
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reactions. This suggested that at least in the current sample, arousal may have more of an
impact on eye-blink magnitude than valence category.
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Figure 1. Emotion modulation of the startle reflex. A significant
quadratic trend was found across the valence categories F(l,80) = 5.13, p
< .03. Mean startle response (magnitude expressed as a T-score) was
smallest in the context of distress pictures and greater for positive and
negative pictures. Error bars represent standard deviations.
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Figure 2. Mean normative arousal ratings for visual stimuli. Normative mean
arousal rating in the distress condition was significantly lower than both the
positive (t = -3.07, p < 0.02) and the negative (t = -3.872; p < 0.00) condition.
The difference between the positive and negative conditions was not significant
(t = 0.44; p < 0.67). Error bars represent standard deviations.

Research Question 2: Psychopathic Personality and Emotion
Modulated Startle
To determine if psychopathic personality was associated with variations in
average maximum blink magnitude in the positive, neutral, negative and distress
conditions, a correlation analysis was conducted. The eight PPI-R subscales were
correlated with average maximum eye-blink magnitude in four valence conditions. The
scales included the PPI-R Total score as well as eight Content scale scores and three PPIR Factor scores. Means and standard deviations for the scores are provided in Table 3.
No PPI-R subscale scores were correlated with the startle magnitude in the positive,
neutral, or distress conditions (Table 4) although an inverse relationship between startle
magnitude in the negative picture condition and Social Influence approached significance
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(r = -0.20; Chi-square = 3.070, p < .08), suggesting that as levels of one’s perceived
ability to influence and manipulate others increased, their startle reactions while viewing
negative (fear-base) images tended to decrease.

Table 3
Means and standard deviations, all PPI-R scales.

Total
Subscale
Machiavellian Egocentricity (ME)
Rebellious Nonconformity (RN)
Blame Extemalization (BE)
Carefree Nonplanfulness (CN)
Social Influence (SOI)
Fearlessness (F)
Stress Immunity (STI)
Factor Scale
Fearless Dominance (FD)
Self-Centered Impulsivity (SCI)
Coldheartedness (C)
Validity Scale
Virtuous Responding (VR)
Deviant Responding (DR)
‘‘N = 81

Mean3

Standard Deviation3

51.42

9.88

50.91
49.96
49.95
48.15
53.22
50.94
50.14

11.33
9.82
9.88
9.07
10.55
10.15
10.12

52.30
50.11
52.33

10.50
10.30
9.93

55.57
54.80

10.57
12.84

Table 4
PPI-R subscales and average maximum blink magnitude,
all valence conditions.
ME
.05

RN

BE

CN

SOI

F

.03

.09

-.06

.06

-.05

STI
.08

Neut

13

-.01

-.07

.05

-.04

.03

Neg

-.07

-.09

.12

.13

-.20

Dis

.05

-,09

.01

.16

Pos

16

-.01

14
17

17
-.06

C
-.01
12
11
.07

Note. ME=Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN=Rebellious Nonconformity; BE=Blame Extemalization;
CN=Carefree Nonplanfulness; SOI=Social Influence; F=Fearlessness; STI=Stress Immunity;
C=Coldheartedness
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Next, the relationship between the PPI-R factor scales and average maximum
blink magnitude in all valence conditions was examined. Calculating numerous
correlations increases the risk of a Type I error, i.e., to erroneously conclude the presence
of a significant correlation. To avoid this, the level of statistical significance of
correlation coefficients was adjusted by Bonferroni’s correction. No significant
relationships were found with Coldheartedness or Self-Centered Impulsivity (Table5).
However, a significant negative correlation (Figure 3) was found between Fearless
Dominance and average maximum blink magnitude during the negative picture condition
(r = -0.26; Chi-square = 5.268, p < .05), suggesting that individuals with higher levels of
this personality trait tended to have an attenuated startle reaction while viewing negative
pictures, but not while viewing other types of images, including those depicting humans
in distress.

Table 5
PPI-R factor scales and average maximum eye-blink
magnitude, all valence conditions.

Positive
Neutral
Negative
Distress

Distress

SCI

FD

C

-.09
-.29**

.05
-.09

-.02

.00
-.02

.06
.05
-.26*
-.15

-.01
12
11

1.00

.07

Note. SCI=Self-Centered Impulsivity; FD=Fearless Dominance;
C=Coldheartedness
**p <
< .05, one-tailed.
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Figure 3. Fearless dominance and average maximum eye-blink magnitude. A
significant negative correlation was found between the PPI-R factor Fearless
Dominance and the mean startle response in the negative picture condition (r = -0.26;
Chi-square = 5.286, p < .05). As mean startle response (magnitude expressed as a Tscore) increased, levels of self-reported fearless dominance decreased.

A final analysis of the relationship between the PPI-R variables was conducted
using difference scores. Specifically, two sets of difference scores were calculated by
subtracting the mean startle magnitude in the positive picture condition from that of the
negative picture condition and from the distress condition. It was predicted that the
difference scores would be positive, thus reflecting the hypothesis of greater blink
magnitude in the negative and distress conditions. The mean of the difference between
positive and negative scores (Category A) was 0.57 with a standard deviation of 6.97.
The mean of the difference between positive and distress scores (Category B) was -1.09
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with a standard deviation of 6.21. Finally the difference scores were correlated with all
PPI-R variables. The prediction was an inverse relationship that would suggest that as
psychopathic personality traits increased, the differences decrease. The findings in this
analysis were not significant (Table 6).

Table 6
PPI-R subscale, factor, and validity scales and difference scores.

A
B

Tot

SCI

FD

VR

DR

ME

RN

BE

CN

SOI

F

STI

C

.08
.02

-.17
-.05

-.08
-.05

.13
.06

.10
-.00

-.08
.00

-.04
-.04

.03
-.05

.13
.15

17
-.04

-.07
-.09

-.16
-.10

-.07
.06

Note. A = Negative minus positive condition; B = Distress minus positive condition; Tot=PPI-R Total
score; SCI=Self-Centered Impulsivity; FD=Fearless Dominance; VR=Virtuous Responding; DR=Deviant
Responding; ME^Machiavellian Egocentricity; RN=Rebellious Nonconformity; BE=Blame
Extemalization; CN=Carefree Nonplanfulness; SOI=Social Influence; F=Fearlessness; STI=Stress
Immunity; C=Coldheartedness. **/? < .01, one-tailed. *p < .05, one-tailed.

Research Question 3: Psychopathic Personality and Risky
Decision Making
A correlation analysis was conducted to determine if there was a significant
relationship between all psychopathic personality variables and total average gambling
score on the Iowa Gambling Task. No significant relationships were found (Table 7). A
negative linear correlation between Virtuous Responding and Total IGT score
approached significance (r = -0.20; Chi-square = 3.079, p < .07) suggesting that
individuals who tended to present themselves in a positive light with relatively little
personality disturbance might also tend to have poorer decision making abilities.
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Table 7
PPI-R subscale, factor, and validity scales and IGT total score.
IGT

IGT
1.0

Tot
.03

SCI
-.03

FD
.00

VR
.20

DR
.09

ME
.06

RN
.06

BE
15

CN
.10

SOI
.07

F
,08

STI
.02

Note. IGT=Iowa Gambling Task total score; Tot=PPI-R Total score; SCI=Self-Centered Impulsivity;
FD=Fearless Dominance; VR=Virtuous Responding; DR=Deviant Responding; ME=Machiavellian
Egocentricity; RN=Rebellious Nonconformity; BE=Blame Extemalization; CN=Carefree Nonplanfiilness;
SOI=Social Influence; F=Fearlessness; STNStress Immunity; C=Coldheartedness

Research Question 4: Emotion Modulated Startle and Risky
Decision Making
A correlation analysis was conducted to determine if there was a significant
relationship between average maximum blink magnitude in each of the four valence
categories and total average gambling score on the Iowa Gambling Task. The mean IGT
T-score for the sample was 39.91 with a standard deviation of 12.18. No significant
relationships were found.

Gender Analysis
As the current sample was predominately female, and the majority of the
reviewed research on psychopathy has been conducted on male subjects, an analysis of
the data was performed to investigate the role of gender differences. A series of two-way
ANOVAs were conducted to analyze the gender effects on the personality, IGT and
emotion modulated startle data. The variables were defined as follows: gender, level of
personality trait (High or Low), level of IGT score (High IGT or Low IGT) and level of
startle magnitude (High or Low) were the categorical variables. Dependent variables
were the T-scores of all PPI-R scales, IGT Total Scale Score, and Average Maximum
Startle Magnitude in each of the four valence conditions. The series of analyses

C
-.03
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conducted in SYSTAT Version 11 revealed a main effect for gender solely on the
Fearless Dominance Factor Scale Score. Males had significantly lower FD scores
overall: F(l,186) = 9.97, p<.00, independent of level of Fearless Dominance. These
results will be discussed in their relationship to the current research on psychopathy in
females in the following section.

Discussion

The unique interpersonal qualities of individuals who fall on the so-called
‘psychopathic spectrum’ have been regularly documented since Cleckley’s observations
(1941). The literature reflects the importance of understanding individuals who have
high and low levels of psychopathic personality traits for research (Lilienfeld, 1998,
Patrick, Edens, Poythress, Lilienfeld & Benning, 2006), clinical (Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen
& Krueger, 2003) and risk assessment purposes (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld &
Cade, 2003) through bringing forth the position that psychopathic traits can fall on a
continuum (Benning, Patrick, Salekin & Leistico, 2005) and are in themselves
maladaptive, independent from the syndrome.
The purpose of this study was to show that psychopathic personality traits in the
general population are associated with deficits in emotion modulated
psychophysiological responses as well as deficits in emotionally influenced decision
making, paralleling the effects observed in psychopathic individuals. Results indicated
that individuals with higher levels of Fearless Dominance had attenuated fear responses,
but there were no abnormalities in responses to other emotional conditions. There was no
association between psychopathic personality traits and emotionally influenced decision
making, suggesting that at subclinical levels, psychopathic personality traits do not
influence an individual’s use of somatic markers to guide behavior. In this case, the
Somatic Marker Hypothesis, at least in terms of its relationship to psychopathy, was not
supported.
The study was broken down into several research questions. First, it was of
interest to replicate the effects of emotionally charged pictures on the startle reflex, which
60
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has been frequently studied in the psychophysiological literature (Corr et ah, 1996, 1997,
2002; Lang, 1993, 1994; Lang et ah, 1997, 2000; Vrana et al, 1988). The consensus of
this literature is that emotions modify the startle response in humans. Particularly, when
an individual is feeling negative emotions, their startle reflex is enhanced compared to
when they are feeling positive emotions. For the present experiment, in addition to the
more frequently studied neutral, positive, and negative emotion conditions, a condition
that consisted of images of humans in distress was added. Images of humans in distress
were chosen based on previous research (Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997) that found
individuals with clinical levels of psychopathy as determined by the PCL-R had reduced
startle responses to distressing images above and beyond general negative (threat)
images. To date, no research has attempted to elucidate the effects of these two types of
negative images in individuals with varying degrees of psychopathic personality traits as
measured by the PPI-R.
In the present experiment, it was found that across valence categories, the startle
response was significantly lower in the distress condition than in either the positive or
negative condition. Contrary to previous research, there was no significant difference
between startles evoked during positive and negative images. The findings suggest that
at least in this experimental population, the behavioral inhibition and activation systems
(BIS/BAS) that drive fear were not differentially engaged in response to these images.
However, results suggested that when viewing the distress pictures, that reflexive
response was attenuated. A potential explanation for these findings might arise after
considering the mean normative arousal ratings for each group of slides. The distressing
images were lower in arousal according to the normative sample ratings than either the
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positive or negative conditions. This might suggest that at least in the present sample, the
level of arousal the individual was feeling while viewing the slides may have had a
greater influence on the startle response than the perceived valence.
In addition, the order of the procedure may have had a cumulative effect upon the
subjects’ responsiveness to the emotional images. The emotion modulated startle phase
of the experiment followed a pre-pulse inhibition phase that prolonged the subjects’
exposure to the acoustic stimuli. Previous research on sensitization effects of different
stimuli on emotion modulated startle is mixed. Some research suggests that the reflex is
relatively robust and holds through sustained, repeated exposure to images (Smith,
Bradley & Lang, 2004; Bradley, Lang & Cuthbert, 1993). Other research suggests that
prolonged exposure to stimuli results in the response sensitization of the defensive
systems (Hamm and Stark, 1993, Blumenthal, 1997, Figueiredo et al., 2003, Koukounas
& Over, 2000). In this case, the pre-pulse inhibition trials may have had a cumulative
attenuation effect upon the subsequent emotion modulation trials. Replication of the
procedure would be needed to support or refute these findings.
The second research question attempted to determine if there was a significant
relationship between psychopathic personality variables and average maximum blink
magnitude. The PPI-R is a measure with demonstrated construct validity. The authors
included a variety of focal constructs relevant to psychopathy. It allows for inclusiveness
of an increased number of lower order facets of psychopathy rather than an estimate of
global or primary/secondary psychopathy as provided by most other psychopathy
measures. Whereas Hare’s checklist suggests a dichotomous view of the construct, that
an individual is either psychopathic or not psychopathic, this study looked at a continuous
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view. In particular, the construction of the items avoided items measuring antisocial or
criminal behaviors because the intention was to develop a measure of the personality
based approach to psychopathy as put forth by Cleckley (1941).
As scores increase on the PPI-R variables, Lilienfeld and Widows (2005)
suggest that individuals have increasing levels of the following characteristics:
narcissism, lack of concern regarding social norms, tendency to blame others,
indifference in planning one’s own actions, perceived ability to influence and manipulate
others, absence of anticipatory anxiety, willingness to participate in risky behaviors, and
callousness. As scores decrease, Lilienfeld and Widows suggest that the level of these
traits in any given individual decreases. Current results, using the conservative
Bonferroni correction, suggested that when viewing pictures in the negative (threat)
condition, individuals with higher levels of Fearless Dominance tended to have an
attenuated startle reaction. Higher levels of Fearless Dominance are associated with lack
of anticipatory social and physiological anxiety, low levels of tension and worry, low
harm avoidance, and high levels of interpersonal dominance. This finding was in
agreement with previous literature concerned with startle reaction and personality (Corr
et al., 1997, 2002). Further, this finding offers additional experimental verification for
the idea that the subtle nuances of psychopathic personality and its impact on behavior
are likely to be ignored through a strictly dichotomous view of the construct.

The

prediction of a significant inverse relationship between startle reactions elicited during
the distressing image condition and psychopathic personality was not supported. These
findings were contrary to what would be predicted by Blair et al, (1997), who found that
psychopaths differentiated by the PCL-R had significantly lower startle reactions while
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viewing images of humans in distress versus images of negative (threat) stimuli. The
findings offered in this study support the view that there are likely differences in emotion
modulated physiological reactions between individuals who have psychopathic
personality traits as measured by the PPI-R and those who have been diagnosed as
clinical level psychopaths, at least in the context of variations in negative emotion.
The third research question addressed the relationship between psychopathic
personality variables and risky decision making as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task.
Based upon findings with sub-clinical psychopaths differentiated by the BIS/BAS
systems (van Honk, Hermans, Putman, Montagne & Schutter, 2002), it was predicted that
individuals with higher levels of psychopathic personality as determined by the PPI-R
would tend to pick more frequently from riskier decks and thus have lower mean
gambling scores. Results suggested no significant relationships between IGT
performance and the individual PPI-R variables, lending further support to the idea that
individuals with psychopathic personality traits who likely do not meet the criteria for
clinical psychopathy may have cognitive strategies that are more similar to non
psychopaths. Further, the data support the idea that the BIS/BAS systems of individuals
with a more extreme level of psychopathic personality as defined by high PCL-R scores
are potentially more different than they are similar.
Interestingly, the relationship between Virtuous Responding and mean gambling
score approached significance. Virtuous Responding on the PPI-R is primarily used to
describe the participant’s test-taking style and approach. In theory, as individuals’ scores
on this measure increase, so would their tendency to portray themselves in a positive
manner and present a view of themselves that is relatively free of serious personality
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flaws. In some cases, extremely high scores on the scale may indicate deliberate attempts
at positive impression management (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Individuals with
higher levels of Virtuous Responding in the present sample tended to have poorer
outcome on the Iowa Gambling Task. This outcome might fall in line with the
hypothesis that poorer IGT scores are associated with other definitions of sub-clinical
psychopathy (van Honk, Hermans, Putman, Montagne & Schutter, 2002; Blair et al.,
2006) because these types of psychopaths have a reputation for presenting themselves in
a positive light at least in social situations (Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 2000). Further
experiments, perhaps with other personality measures with scales similar to the Virtuous
Responding scale (e.g., the MMPI-2) would be needed to offer further support for this
explanation.
Finally, the relationship between risky decision making and emotion modulated
startle was explored. Considering the cognitive and emotional deficits in psychopaths, it
was predicted that in as the individual’s mean gambling score decreased, so would the
individual’s startle reactions in the emotionally modulated negative conditions.
However, findings concerning the relationship between these two variables suggested
that at least with the current sample, there were no significant relationships with emotion
modulated startle.
The lack of significant relationship between Iowa Gambling Task outcome and
the other results in the predicted direction calls into question the utility of the IGT for
measuring emotional response in psychopathic personality. According to Damasio’s
Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), decision making can be viewed as a combination of
‘high reason,’ carrying out a logical cost-benefit analysis of a given action, and marker
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signals, indicating how rewarding or punishing an action is likely to be in complex
situations where more detailed cost-benefit analysis is not possible. (Damasio et al.,
1991; Damasio, 1994, 1996, 2004). Impairments in individuals with bilateral ablations of
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and related areas (Damasio et al., 1991) as well as
individuals with sub-clinical psychopathy defined by BAS/BIS differences (van Honk et
al., 2002) have been noted. However, there has yet to be an empirical verification of
deficits in decision making in individuals with psychopathic personality traits as
differentiated by the PPI-R. This study used a fairly large sample (n=81) and measured
continuous relationships. Van Honk et al (2002) used two groups selected on low and
high BAS/BIS characteristics from the outer extreme ranges of an extremely large subject
pool (n=525). It is perhaps due to their large subject pool that the previous researchers
were able to distinguish between groups on the IGT. The present study did not utilize a
median split design in order to preserve variance in the sample. Additionally, the PPI-R
is an arguably more diverse measure, including subscales that aim to quantify level of
behavioral activation or inhibition as well as other subscales that are designed to
investigate the higher level emotional qualities that are unique to psychopathy, including
superficial charm and lack of empathy.
Other researchers have been critical of the validity of the IGT for evaluating the
relationship between emotional functioning and risk taking behavior. For example, it has
been argued that if the reward/punishment schedule can be consciously comprehended by
participant prior to the development of somatic markers, cognitive outcome expectancies
rather than somatic markers could guide successful IGT performance (Turnbull et al.,
2003). Additionally, research has reported participant awareness of the
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reward/punishment schedule as early as 20 trials into the task (Bowman et ah, 2005).
Further research by Maia and McClelland (2004) suggested that the IGT can be
performed through access to conscious, explicit knowledge. The crucial point outlined in
the Iowa laboratory is that anticipatory Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) differentiate
between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks over time (Bechara et al., 1996).
Some research has found that anticipatory SCR differences have been reported only in a
sub-group of the best performing healthy control participants. Crone et al (2004) split
participants into three equal sized groups of poor, moderate, and good IGT performers,
based on the total number of selections they made from the advantageous decks during
the tasks. Anticipatory SCRs were greater for the disadvantageous than advantageous
decks for the good performers group only. Analysis of the current data set revealed that
the majority of the sample consisted of bad performers (e.g., those who ended up with a
net loss of money). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis relies on anticipatory SCR data to
suggest that emotional processes are involved in decision making. However, work done
by Bradley et al (2001) suggests that SCRs are primarily sensitive arousal but do not
discriminate between positive and negative valence, suggesting that they may not be the
most accurate index of determining if an underlying emotion-based marker is indicating a
decision to be good or bad. To summarize, there has been limited external replication of
anticipatory SCR data on the IGT. It is also unclear whether SCR findings represent a
response to feedback, an indicator of risk, a marker of post-decision emotion state, or a
signal of how good a particular response is. Finally, it has been found in the Iowa lab
that not all normal controls perform advantageously Bechara & Damasio, 2002).
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Importantly, the IGT, while supporting neural substrates of decision making, may
not address an important component to psychopathy: aggressive behavior. According to
Blair et al. (2006), psychopathic behavior can be characterized by both reactive
aggression (impulsivity, etc.), and another type of aggression, instrumental aggression
(planned attack). A frontal lobe dysfunction within individuals who display aggressive
behavior has been well documented. Grafman, Schwab, Warden, Pridgen et al., (1996)
reported that orbital and ventrolateral frontal cortex rather than dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex that was associated with increased risk for aggression. Psychopaths have deficits
in response reversal and extinction tasks that employ the orbital/ventrolateral cortex
(Rolls, 1997). Perhaps Damasio’s task best differentiates ventromedial dysfunction, yet
the true deficit in psychopaths is more related to orbitofrontal dysfunction. In either case,
the current data suggest that performance on the IGT is likely unrelated to variations in
psychopathic personality traits in community samples.
To conclude, the current study attempted to replicate the emotion modulated
startle reflex and demonstrate that variations in psychopathic personality traits influence
the startle reflex as well as an individual’s inherent ability to utilize somatic markers to
guide decision making behavior. When considering the fear potentiated startle reflex, the
significant data suggest that there was an inverse relationship between the individual’s
reactions to fearful stimuli and their level Fearless Dominance. The data also suggested
that there was a marginal relationship between performance on the IGT and the way
individuals presented themselves in a positive light, which might be one quality of
psychopathy. However, data did not support a relationship between psychopathic
personality traits and emotion-modulated responses to images of humans in distress nor
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did it support a relationship between psychopathic personality traits and an individual’s
use of somatic markers during the IGT. In general, results suggest that the neurological
and behavioral characteristics of clinical psychopaths and individuals with sub-clinical
psychopathic traits may be more different than they are similar.
The significant relationship between an individual’s level of Fearless Dominance
and their psychophysiological reactivity to fearful images in their environment may have
important implications for treatment. As previously mentioned, research suggests that
individuals with higher levels of FD tend to have lower levels of Axis I pathology
including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and risk for suicidal behavior (Patrick,
Edens, Poythress Lilienfeld & Benning, 2005). Despite this, the qualities identified by
the Fearless Dominance construct might be found in pathological mania (e.g., Bipolar I
Disorder, Single Manic Episode) as well as a variety of Axis II pathologies including, for
example, Antisocial Personality Disorder (of which a reckless disregard for safety is
included). Depending upon the degree of impairment in their social, occupational, or
relational functioning, these individuals may still become involved in therapy, either
voluntarily or involuntarily (e.g., as the result of a court-ordered evaluation). As such,
clinicians who use the PPI-R in an assessment battery might use it to clarify Axis II
personality traits in an individual. Further, the understanding that these Axis II traits may
have origins in specific brain regions such as the fear circuit underscores the need for
treatment. Perhaps treatment designed to increase the individual’s awareness of the
differences in the way they behave in their environment in response to threat versus the
way other people typically respond would be useful. In particular, facilitation of insight
into individual differences could improve the way the personality disordered individual
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relates to others in society at both the micro (e.g., partner relationships) and macro (e.g.,
societal rule violations) levels. Analyses of gender differences revealed limited findings.
The significant findings were again directly related to Fearless Dominance. Overall the
males included in the study had lower levels of Fearless Dominance. However, these
results should be interpreted cautiously due to male subjects having a restricted sample
size. Research on psychopathy in females is relatively new and underrepresented in the
field. Although Cleckley (1941) and Hare (1993) have previously written case studies of
female psychopaths, experimental research on psychopathy in females is relatively recent
and highly limited (Rogstadt & Rogers, 2008). Some experimental evidence suggests
that fundamental emotional information-processing deficits observed in male
psychopaths may generalize to female psychopaths (Vitale, Brinkley, Hiatt, & Newman,
2007). Additionally, Sutton, Vitale, and Newman (2002)_demonstrated that female
psychopaths exhibit a moderately attenuated startle reflex while viewing unpleasant
pictures. The latter study provided the first evidence of emotion processing deficits in
female psychopaths.
In 2005, Forouzan & Cook discussed their opinions on the relevant factors
concerning gender differences in psychopathy. They suggested that the important
differences between genders may lie in the expression of psychopathic behavior,
interpersonal characteristics, psychological motivations, and potential bias in the
assessment of psychopathy according to social norms. Each of these different factors
would presumably impact treatment regimens designed for individuals with psychopathy,
however much more research is needed in these areas before effectiveness could be
assessed. Certainly, a gender sensitive treatment regimen would be important in a
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proposed psychopathic treatment program. For example, given the gender differences in
emotion expression, female psychopaths in treatment could potentially have a greater
chance of success when compared with male psychopaths. Rogstadt & Rogers (2008) put
forth the view that although interventions focusing on interpersonal or affective features
of the syndrome have been dismissed for use with men, they suggest that these
interventions might be effective for female psychopaths, who tend to possess higher
levels of positive features such as empathy. Despite this, the current findings would
suggest that at least when considering the trait of fearlessness in subclinical populations,
some women may in fact have less sensitivity to threat in their environment and
correspondingly less trouble with anxiety and Axis I disorders. A non-psychopathic
individual’s level of Fearless Dominance as measured by the PPI-R could potentially be
used an indicator of relative immunity to a variety of anxiety disorders. Further clinical
outcome research is clearly needed in this area to determine the effects of gender
sensitive treatment regimens with the individuals who demonstrate psychopathic traits.
Sound clinical outcome research would need to evaluate tailored treatment programs that
take into account the type of psychopathy, whether clinical or subclinical, as well as the
differences between male and female emotional processing and expression.
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IAPS Identification Numbers and Picture Descriptions

Positive
5760
5200
5480
4311
8180
8490
5629
8400
8185
4670
8186

Nature
Flowers
Fireworks
Erotic Female
Cliff Divers
Roller Coaster
Hiker
Rafters
Sky divers
Erotic Couple
Skysurfer

Neutral
7211
7044
7402
7590
5531
7224
7160
7705
7235
7052
7217

Clock
Scale
Pastry
Traffic
Mushrooms
File Cabinets
Fabric
Cabinet
Chair
Clothespins
Clothes Rack
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Negative
3071 Mutilation
3064 Mutilation
3005.1 Open Grave
9810 KKK Rally
6260 Aimed Gun
9570 Dog
9910 Car Accident
6300 Knife
9600 Ship
1050 Snake
1300 Pit Bull
Distress
3180 Battered Female
2141 Grieving Female
2703 Sad Children
3022 Scream
2900.1 Crying Boy
3220 Hospital
6313 Attack
6834 Police
2799 Funeral
9421 Soldier
9429 Assault

PPI-R Instructions and Sample Questions

Instructions: “The items that you will be reading and answering describe many different
ways that people can think and feel. There are no right or wrong answers, and by
answering each item as honestly as you can, you will help me have a better understanding
of your feelings and beliefs. These items have been answered by thousands of
individuals and will help us get a better understanding of how you are the same as or
different from other people. As you will see, the instructions ask you to read a list of
items and rate how true or false the description is for you. If you aren’t sure whether an
item is true or false for you, choose the answer that is closest to how you would describe
yourself. Please answer all the items as best as you can, even if some are difficult or
don’t seem to apply to you. If you have any questions or concerns, please don’t hesitate
to ask. You will be asked to verify if you are sure of your answer after you make a
selection. Please indicate “Y” for yes or “N” for no. If you choose “N” you will have the
opportunity to go back to the previous answer and change it before moving on to the next
item.”
1). If I really want to, I can persuade most people of almost anything.
FALSE
MOSTLY FALSE MOSTLY TRUE
TRUE
3). Dangerous activities like skydiving scare me more than they do most people.
FALSE
MOSTLY FALSE
MOSTLY TRUE
TRUE
10). I am easily flustered in pressured situations.
FALSE
MOSTLY FALSE
MOSTLY TRUE

TRUE

13). When my life gets boring, I like to take chances.

FALSE

MOSTLY FALSE

MOSTLY TRUE

TRUE

18). A lot of people have tried to “stab me in the back.”
FALSE
MOSTLY FALSE MOSTLY TRUE

TRUE

24). I am hardly ever the center of attention.

FALSE

MOSTLY FALSE

MOSTLY TRUE

TRUE

28). I tend to get crabby and irritable when I have too many things to do.
FALSE
MOSTLY FALSE
MOSTLY TRUE
TRUE
32). I don’t let everyday hassles get on my nerves.
FALSE
MOSTLEY FALSE MOSTLY TRUE

TRUE

34). I have a talent for getting people to talk to me.

FALSE

MOSTLY FALSE

MOSTLY TRUE
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TRUE

Participant Instructions for Startle Segment

“In this phase of the experiment, you will be asked to first view several slides of abstract
patterns. Please keep your eyes fixed straight ahead on the screen. During the second
phase, you will be asked to view different pictures displayed on the computer screen in
front of you.
It is important that your eyes be directed towards the screen when the pictures are shown
to you. You will have a few seconds to view each picture. Please remember to view the
picture for the entire time it is displayed.
While you are viewing each picture, try to imagine yourself actually being in the setting
or encountering the object you see. Imagine how you would feel if you encountered the
object or situation in real life. While you are viewing the pictures, please ignore the
sounds you may hear through your headphones. If you have any questions, please ask the
experimenter at this time.”
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Iowa Gambling Task Instructions

“In front of you on the screen there are 4 decks of cards A, B, C, and D. I want you to
select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you choose. Each time
you select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money. I don’t know
how much money you will win. You will find out as we go along. Every time you win,
the green bar gets bigger. Every so often however, when you click on a card, the
computer tells you that you won some money, but then it says that you lost some money
too. I don’t know when you will lose, or how much you will lose. You will find out as
we go along. Every time you lose, the green bar gets smaller.
You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at any time, as often as you
wish. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible, and if you can’t win,
avoid losing money as much as possible. You won’t know when then game will end.
You must keep on playing until the computer stops. I am going to give you this $2000
credit, the green bar, to start the game. The red bar here is a reminder of how much
money you borrowed to play the game, and how much money you have to pay back
before we see how much you won or lost. It is important to know that just like in a real
card game the computer does not change the order of the cards after the game starts. You
may not be able to figure out exactly when you will lose money, but the game is fair.
The computer does not make you lose money at random, or make you lose money based
on the last card you picked. Also, each deck contains an equal number of cards of each
color, so the color of the cards does not tell you which decks are better in this game. So
you must not try to figure out what the computer is doing. All I can say is that some
decks are worse than others. You may find all of them bad, but some are worse than
others. No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win if you stay away
from the worst decks. Please treat the play money in this game as real money, and any
decision on what to do with it should be made as if you were using your own money.”
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Informed Consent Letter

Informed Consent Document
For
Variations in Emotional Behavior as a Function of Personality Type
Principal Investigator: Paul Haerich, Ph.D.
Co-Investigator: Kristen Godenick, M.A.
Purpose
You are invited to participate in this research study to help us better understand the
interplay of individual differences in personality with human reflexes, human cognition,
and human interpersonal interaction. This research study will investigate the way people
respond to various pictures and sounds and the way they perform on a computerized
decision-making task, in the context of certain aspects ofpersonality evaluated with a
simple questionnaire. The pictures you will be viewing have been chosen to cover a
variety of things individuals might encounter in their life. The cognitive task asks you to
choose different cards out offour response decks. Finally, your responses on the
personality questionnaire are true/false responses and will reflect whether or not you feel
the statement accurately describes you.
Procedure
During this study, you will first view a series of pictures depicting various subjects
including (listed alphabetically): animals, guns, household objects, human nudes, nature
scenes, mutilations, plants, rocks, snakes, spiders, sports scenes, etc. From time to time
while viewing these slides, a brief, loud noise also will occur. The sounds used in this
study are similar in loudness and duration to a loud handclap, or a book being dropped.
This procedure also will involve collecting information regarding the activity of the heart
and of the muscles involved in the eye blink. A small device that clips onto the end of
one finger will measure heart rate activity. Eye muscle activity will be measured by
small, button-like sensors, which will be taped below your left eye and one behind the
ear. Finally, two larger sensors will be taped to the palm of your left hand. These
sensors will be used to measure small changes in the amount of sweat being produced an indicator of small changes in the activity level of part of the nervous system.
In the second portion of this study, you will be asked to complete a brief computer task
that will ask you to choose cards from four decks. As you choose cards, your goal will be
to maximize winnings.
In the third portion of the study, you will be asked to complete a computerized
personality questionnaire. For each item on the questionnaire you will be asked to rate a
series of statements about your feelings, opinions and attitudes on a numerical scale using
the computer keyboard.
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It should take approximately 70 minutes to complete your participation in this study.
Risks
There is no increased risk associated with participation in this study beyond that of
everyday life. Therefore, the committees at both CSU San Bernardino (Department of
Psychology Institutional Review Board Sub-Committee) and Loma Linda University
(Institutional Review Board) that review human studies have determined that
participating in this study exposes you to minimal risk. The official stamp appearing on
this form indicates this approval.
Although this study has been deemed of minimal risk, you should be aware that some of
the content of certain slides may lead to feelings of surprise or may make you feel uneasy
or uncomfortable. The sounds may be relatively loud and may cause surprise or be
startling, but in no case will the sounds be louder than 110 dB, which, for the type of
sounds used, has been determined by the Occupational and Safety Health Administration
to be below the level that could cause temporary or permanent hearing problems.
Benefits and Reimbursement
You should not expect to receive any direct benefit from your participation in this
research study other than the educational experience of participating in a scientific
psychological research project. It is anticipated that the results of this study will help
advance our understanding of how different people, with different personalities respond
to emotional stimuli and situations. We hope that this information will eventually be
useful in improving or targeting psychotherapy techniques.
Compensation
Although not a benefit from the research study itself, you may receive extra credit for a
course. If you are a student at CSUSB your extra credit will be in the form of a slip for 5
units of extra credit and, at the discretion of your instructor, you may receive extra credit
points for your class.
Confidentiality
All of the information gathered during your participation in this research study is
confidential and will be handled anonymously. That means that your name will not be
attached to or stored with your responses. The information you provide will be grouped
with that of other participants. Any publications or presentations resulting from this
study will refer only to the grouped results.
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Third Party Contact & Questions
If at any time you have any other questions regarding your participation in this study, you
should feel free to contact Paul Haerich, PhD at the Department of Psychology, Loma
Linda University, (phone: 909-558-4770).
If you wish to contact an impartial third party not associated with this study regarding
any complaint about the study, you may contact the Office of Patient Relations, Loma
Linda University Medical Center, Loma Linda, CA 92354 (phone: 909-558-4647), for
information and assistance.
Participant’s Rights
Participation in this study is voluntary. If, after signing this consent form, you decide to
discontinue the session at any time, for any reason, you are free to do so. Discontinuing
the session will not jeopardize your class standing or grade. You will receive extra credit
for your participation whether you complete the session or not. If you have any questions
regarding this study, we will be happy to answer them.
Consent Statement
By placing an X in the space below I acknowledge that I have been informed of and that
I have understand, the nature and purpose of this study, and Ifreely consent to
participate. I have read the contents of the consent form and have been given the
opportunity to ask questions concerning the study. I have been offered a copy of this
form. I acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age. I hereby give my voluntary
consent to participate in this study. Signing this consent form does not waive my rights
nor does it release the investigators or institution(s) from their responsibilities. I may
call Paul Haerich, Ph.D. at (909) 558-4770 ifI have additional questions or concerns.
Participant’s X
Date:
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